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MOBILITY OF STUDENTS AND THE FINANCIAL 
SUSTAINABILITY OF HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEMS IN 
THE EU: A UNION OF HARMONY OR IRRECONCILABLE 
DIFFERENCES?
Alexander Hoogenboom*
Summary: The purpose of this contribution is to explore the apparent 
conflict between the promotion of student mobility on the one hand 
and the interests of the Member States in ensuring the (financial) su-
stainability of their higher education system on the other. To this end, 
the paper is divided into three parts. The first part presents an over-
view and analysis of the legal principles applying to student mobility 
developed by the Court of Justice in its case law. The second part 
explores and analyses both sides of the debate as to whether Mem-
ber States should be able to invoke budgetary concerns as ground for 
justification for a restriction of the rights of mobile students set out in 
the first part.  The third part finally argues that as a general principle, 
such unilateral attempts at restriction by the Member State should be 
rejected but that at the same time there is cause to take the concerns 
of these Member States seriously. In the end, it is suggested that a 
multilateral approach at EU level is perhaps the only solution capable 
of addressing the conflict. 
1. Introduction
The mobility of students in the European Union is a phenomenon 
of ever-increasing importance in the EU, with more than half a million 
EU students choosing to study in an EU Member State different from 
their nationality for part of their studies or for full courses abroad. This 
represents an increase in mobile students of about 50% in comparison 
to 2000.1 These migration flows have been strongly stimulated by the 
increasing support for this type of cross-border movement by policy ma-
kers at national and EU/European level2 as well as by the case law of the 
* PhD researcher at the Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, and Visiting Fellow at the 
Faculty of Law, University of Western Australia.
1 Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2011) ‘Progress Towards the Common Eu-
ropean Objectives in Education and Training (2010/2011): Indicators and Benchmarks’ 
33-40.
2 For an overview of the Bologna process, see European Higher Education Area website 
2010-2020 <http://www.ehea.info/> accessed 2 November 2013. At the EU level: Commi-
ssion, Promoting the Learning Mobility of Young People (Green Paper) COM(2009) 329 final; 
and European Parliament Resolution of 23 September 2008 on the Bologna Process and 
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Court of Justice.  At the same time, however, the recent series of cases 
assessing the lawfulness of residence requirements designed to curb the 
influx of foreign students, or to delimit the circle of beneficiaries of por-
table study grants, shows that Member States have increasingly become 
concerned about the financial consequences of such mobility.
This paper seeks to explore this apparent conflict between the pro-
motion of student mobility on the one hand and the interests of the Mem-
ber States in ensuring the (financial) sustainability of their higher edu-
cation system on the other. First, it will provide an overview of the legal 
principles developed by the Court in its case law and discuss recent de-
velopments therein based on three themes: access to higher education, 
equal treatment as regards study facilitating benefits in the host State, 
and the export of study grants from the home State. The second part will 
seek to provide context to and analyse both sides of the recent debate as 
to whether Member States can invoke budgetary concerns, in particular 
in the light in the context of the economic crisis, as a ground for justifi-
cation for restrictions imposed on the mobility of students. The third part 
will ultimately argue that as a general principle attempts at justification 
on economic grounds should be rejected in view of the strong (economic) 
benefits attached to such mobility. At the same time, however, the ‘one 
size fits all’ nature of the legal principles developed by the Court has a 
differential impact on the Member States of the EU. This has the con-
sequence that some Member States, in a relative sense, contribute to a 
much greater extent to the public good of student mobility than others. 
Given the current tension between the aims of student mobility and the 
financial sustainability of domestic higher education systems, it is sugge-
sted that a multilateral approach at EU level may perhaps be the only so-
lution capable of reconciling the aims by fairly distributing the (financial) 
responsibilities of the Member States.
2. EU law and the mobility of students
There is a relatively long history in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
the student with a nationality of one of the Member States crossing bor-
ders in search of (post-secondary) education.3 With a view to categorising 
the extensive case law of the Court in this regard, two distinct legal regi-
mes can be discerned at the summa divisio level: cases involving a claim 
by an EU citizen of equal treatment to the nationals of the host Member 
State as regards access to education, and cases involving equal treatment 
Mobility (2008/2070(INI)), OJ (2010) C8 E/18. Moreover, consider that at the national level 
some 24 Member State offer some form of portable study allowances.
3 Starting nearly 40 years ago with Case 9/74 Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München 
[1974] ECR 773. 
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as regards the conditions under which the rights of free movement of stu-
dents are exercised.4 
This division has its origins in a set of cases decided in the 1980s 
and involved the scope ratione materiae of what is now Article 18 TFEU. 
Whereas the conditions of access to vocational training were held to fall 
within the scope of the then Article 7 EEC (linked as it was with the free 
movement of workers and the competence of the EEC to foster the esta-
blishment of a common vocational policy),5 maintenance aid in the form 
of study grants were considered a matter of social/educational policy 
belonging to the Member States. It followed that the latter, ‘at the current 
stage of development of EC law’, fell outside the scope of that Article.6 
This distinction was maintained for a period of 17 years until the semi-
nal case of Bidar.7 In that case, the Court departed from its older case 
law and held that in the light of the introduction of EU citizenship and 
the new (albeit limited) EC competences in the area of education, study 
grants could now properly be seen as falling within the scope of the Tre-
aty for the purposes of the then Article 12 TEC.8 
While the two regimes were thus put on the same footing, it will ne-
vertheless be shown below that the legacy of the original distinction con-
tinues to have consequences today: if a measure is considered to affect 
‘access to education’, the Court will subject it to a more rigorous scrutiny 
than when it concerns study facilitating benefits, where the approach of 
the Court is more hands-off. This division also resonates more generally 
within the internal market:9 measures that impede access ‘at the gate’ 
are usually treated more harshly than those that apply to and modify the 
conditions under which free movement rights are exercised.10 One could 
compare the issue with the free movement of goods: measures strongly 
and directly impeding access, such as quantitative restrictions and cu-
4 This distinction was already noted at an early stage by AG Slynn in his Opinion delivered 
on 28 June 1988 in Case C-42/87 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 5445. See also AG 
Sharpston in her Opinion delivered on 25 June 2009 in Case C-73/08 Bressol [2010] ECR 
I-2735, paras 80ff (emphasis added).
5 Case 293/83 Françoise Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593, paras 18ff.
6 Case 39/86 Sylvie Lair v Universität Hannover [1988] ECR 3161, para 15.
7 Case C-209/03 The Queen, on application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and 
Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119. See also Case C-184/99 Rudy 
Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193, 
paras 34ff.
8 Bidar (n 7), paras 30-42.
9 See also the distinction made in Regulation 492/2011 between chapter 1, section 1, 
which concerns access to employment, and chapter 1, section 2, which deals with equal 
treatment as regards the conditions of employment. See further the Opinion of AG Lenz in 
Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921, in particular para 210.
10 The more serious the infringement, the stricter the proportionality test conducted by the 
Court and vice versa: J Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27(3) Legal Issues of Econo-
mic Integration 239, 264.
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stom duties11 in the strict sense, are deemed to go to the very heart of the 
operation of the internal market. As a result, the former only allows for 
limited derogations,12 whereas the latter are prohibited outright. Where, 
however, it concerns measures which apply ‘within’ the Member States, 
modifying the conditions under which goods are sold, such as the Keck 
‘Certain Selling Arrangements’13 and the internal taxation regime under 
Article 110 TFEU, the discretion of the Member States is greater (and the 
test applied by the Court more lenient).14
Similarly, where a Member State seeks to impede access to educati-
on by foreign EU nationals (the ‘very essence of the principle of freedom 
of movement for students’15) by imposing higher tuition fees than apply 
for domestic students16 or quantitative restrictions such as those at issue 
in Bressol,17 we see that the former have always been prohibited outright, 
while the latter are only allowed in very exceptional circumstances. In 
contrast, where it concerns equal treatment as regards study facilitating 
benefits (which modify the conditions under which free movement rights 
of students are exercised), the freedom granted to the Member State to 
restrict eligibility for such grants is greater.18 At the same time, this dis-
tinction should, of course, not be taken too strictly: denial of a certain be-
nefit (eg a study grant) may cast its shadow before it and discourage the 
student from exercising his or her free movement at all, thus impeding 
the student’s access to education abroad.19 Nevertheless, it is submitted 
that a certain localisation on a scale ranging from measures that impact 
on enrolment versus measures further removed from access and towards 
conditions under which free movement is exercised does take place, as 
will be seen below.
2.1 Access to education
The main rule in this regard is that any EU citizen exercising his 
or her free movement rights as enshrined in Article 21 TFEU can rely 
11 As well as CEEs which by definition only apply to ‘border measures’, see Article 30 TFEU 
and Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193.
12 See Article 36 TFEU.
13 Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097.
14 See generally, C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (OUP 2013) 
ch 3, 5; and H-G Kamann, ‘Artikel 110 AEUW’ in R. Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV (Verlag CH 
Beck 2012) 1431-1436.
15 Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria (diploma requirements) [2005] ECR I-5969, para 70.
16 Gravier (n 5).
17 Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and Others v Gouvernement de la Communaute francaise 
[2010] ECR I-2735.
18 See below.
19 This has led Snell to argue that the distinction is normatively and conceptually fallacio-
us: J Snell, ‘The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or Slogan?’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 437, 
443-446.
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on Article 18 TFEU to claim equal treatment concerning the conditions 
of access to education.20 This equal treatment right is a strong one and 
militates against restrictions of various kinds ranging from differential 
tuition fees to discriminatory diploma requirements. Attempts at justi-
fication of these restrictions by the Member State are normally treated 
harshly and are rejected.
2.1.1 Scope ratione materiae I: vocational training or education?
Historically, the Court has always referred to equal treatment as re-
gards the conditions of access to ‘vocational training’. This concept was 
first developed in Gravier, and its emergence in the legal dictionary of the 
Court can largely be explained by the latter’s attempt to imbue its ruling 
in that case with a degree of legitimacy. The context of the Gravier case 
was that of a European Economic Community in which rights of free 
movement and equal treatment were primarily granted to market citizens 
(with some derivative rights for family members): individuals with the 
nationality of one of the Member States who sought to pursue an econo-
mic activity in the host Member State. Françoise Gravier, however, was a 
French national and a ‘pure student’: she sought to cross borders solely 
for the purpose of studying in the host State. It was thus not immediately 
clear why she should be able to rely on Article 7 EEC to challenge the fee 
system that Belgium had imposed which discriminated on grounds of na-
tionality. However, then Article 128 EEC referred to the competence of the 
EEC to establish a ‘common vocational policy’, which in the eyes of the 
Court clearly brought issues regarding access to such vocational training 
within the scope of EEC law for the purposes of applying the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality.21 This did mean, however, 
that the Court was ‘stuck’ with this concept of vocational training. This 
was overcome, however, by a broad definition of that concept: 
any form of education which prepares for a qualification for a parti-
cular profession, trade or employment or which provides the nece-
ssary training and skills for such a profession, trade or employment 
is vocational training, (…).22
In Blaizot, the Court confirmed that ‘vocational training’ was truly 
a Union concept which defied national classifications23 and included in 
general also ‘academic’ or higher education provided in university insti-
tutes as these provide the knowledge or skills an individual might need in 
the exercise of a profession. However, courses intended solely to improve 
20 Bressol (n 17) paras 30-32.
21 In addition to the links between the mobility of students and the free movement of wor-
kers, see Gravier (n 5) para 20ff.
22 ibid para 30.
23 Case 24/86 Vincent Blaizot v University of Liège and others [1988] ECR 379, paras 15-21.
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the general knowledge of participants rather than preparing them for the 
pursuit of a particular occupation were excluded from this concept.24 In 
addition, Humbel suggests that at least primary education is excluded 
from the concept and that concerning secondary education regard must 
be had to whether the instruction, taken as an indivisible whole, also 
includes elements preparing the pupil for a particular trade, profession 
or employment – if not, secondary education will not constitute ‘vocatio-
nal training’.25 
It would follow from the forgoing that primary, secondary and tertiary 
education lacking an economic nexus (preparation for a trade/professi-
on) fall outside the scope of Article 18 TFEU, allowing therefore Member 
States to maintain, for example, an enrolment fee system, discrimina-
ting against migrant EU nationals for such courses. At the same time, 
the issue has not been revisited recently. It is arguable that for the rea-
sons already mentioned by the Court in Bidar, namely the introduction of 
EU citizenship and the attendant free movement rights (thereby moving 
beyond the economic nexus) and the creation of the (limited) competen-
ces of the EU covering education more generally,26 the scope of Article 18 
TFEU goes beyond vocational training and also covers equal treatment 
as regards education in a general sense.27 There is support for this inter-
pretation in Bressol, where the Court refers, in general, to the obligation 
of the Member States to have due regard to Union law, and in particular 
the free movement provisions and the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, when organising their education systems and 
vocational training28 (the obligation thus applying to both separately).29
2.1.2 Scope ratione materiae II: conditions of access to education
The second aspect to be considered is the breadth of the principle of 
equal treatment in terms of the measures enacted by the Member States 
it catches. The cases of Gravier and Forcheri confirm that the imposition 
24 ibid para. 20.
25 Case 263/86 Belgian State v René Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Edel [1988] ECR 5365, 
paras 8-13, 22-25.
26 See current Articles 165 and 166 TFEU, as well as Article 9 TFEU.
27 It should be noted that EU workers and their family members, on the basis of Article 7(2) 
and 10 of Regulation 492/2011, in any case enjoy a right of equal treatment with regard to 
all forms of education: Humbel (n 25) para. 24. See further: A-P van der Mei, Free Movement 
of Persons in the European Community: Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits (Hart Publis-
hing 2003) 349, 375.
28 Bressol (n 17) para 28-29.
29 See further H van Eijken, ‘Zijn er nog grenzen aan gelijkheid? – De spanning tussen 
gelijke behandeling van Unieburgers versus de bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen de Unie en 
lidstaten’ (2010) 6 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 181, who discusses the ten-
sion between the principle of equal treatment and the (remaining) discretion of the Member 
States in organising their (higher) education systems.
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of higher tuition fees for migrant EU nationals than host Member State 
nationals constitutes a violation of Article 18 TFEU.30 Moreover, creative 
Member States seeking to introduce a practice whereby discriminatory 
tuition fees on the ‘demand side’ (student side) are removed, but are ne-
vertheless enforced on the supply side (the educational establishment), 
are equally in breach of that Article: in response to Gravier, Belgium equ-
alised the tuition fees, but at the same time adopted a practice in which it 
relegated most categories of foreign students to the category of ‘non-fun-
ded student’ when a certain extremely limited threshold was reached.31 
This effectively forced educational establishments to exclude such foreign 
students or risk being underfunded.32 The Court held that this construc-
tion, in essence, had the same exclusionary effect as the original discri-
minatory tuition fees assessed in Gravier and found a violation of what 
is now Article 18 TFEU.33 In Brown, a final variant was considered by the 
Court: in Scotland, all students were required to pay a tuition fee but 
the devolved authority (selectively) reimbursed (in full or in part) that fee 
through its study grant system. The Court ruled that such contributions 
did not constitute maintenance aid (at the time still excluded from Article 
18 TFEU) and thus had to be provided to migrant EU nationals under 
conditions that did not discriminate on grounds of nationality.34
But the concept goes further than this. In Commission v Austria (di-
ploma requirements), Austria had introduced an access condition tied to 
the secondary education diploma qualifying the student for university 
education: in order to gain access to a course of study offered at a uni-
versity established in Austria, the student had to show that he or she 
fulfilled any special admission criteria for the same course of study in 
the Member State in which he or she had obtained his or her secondary 
education diploma. It followed, for example, that German nationals who 
did not manage to get a place to study medicine in Germany due to the 
operation of the numerus clausus were also barred from studying medici-
ne in Austria. As such, Austria sought to rely on a form of the principle of 
mutual recognition in the context of recognition of diplomas for academic 
purposes, a policy area which moreover fell outside the scope of the Tre-
aties (or so Austria submitted). The Court nevertheless held this to con-
stitute an ‘access condition’ which could be examined for compatibility 
30 Gravier (n 5) para 26 and Case 152/82 Forcheri [1983] ECR 2323, paras 17-18.
31 Funding would not be provided for those foreign students in excess of 2% of the Belgian 
students who were included for the purposes of determining the funding of the educational 
establishment in the previous academic year: Commission v Belgium (n 4) para 3.
32 ibid para 8.
33 ibid paras 8-9.
34 Case 197/86 Steven Malcolm Brown v The Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 
3205, para 15-17; Case C-357/89 VJM Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen 
[1992] ECR I-1027, para 34.
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with Article 18 TFEU.35 
Finally, in the case of Bressol, the French Community of Belgium 
sought to limit the places available for non-resident students for a set 
of nine (para)medical and veterinary courses, in effect seeking to reserve 
study places for the domestic population. These quotas were also consi-
dered for compatibility with Article 18 TFEU.36
Overall, therefore, the Court seems to adhere to a broad concept 
of ‘conditions of access’ that will be considered for compatibility with 
EU law: any measure that impedes enrolment into a course or otherwise 
impedes the acquisition of student status will be caught (and, as will be 
seen, will be subjected to rigorous examination by the Court).37 As such, 
few measures will escape its grasp. 
2.1.3 Scope ratione personae 
Thirdly, it should be mentioned that the scope ratione personae is 
equally broad: any EU citizen can invoke these equal treatment rights 
and no distinction in the ‘strength’ of the claim of equal treatment is 
made based on whether the EU citizen is economically active or not (unli-
ke under the regime to be discussed below).38
2.1.4 Equal treatment and the scope for justification
As a fourth and final point, a few words are needed on the attempts 
of the Member States seeking to justify infringements to the principle of 
equal treatment as regards the conditions of access to education. Loo-
king at the relevant cases,39 it seems fair to conclude that the ECJ seems 
to take a very dim view of Member States’ attempts to derogate from or 
justify their breach of equal treatment where it concerns access to edu-
cation. As seen above, the ECJ has underlined that the opportunity for 
EU students to access higher education in other Member States consti-
tutes the very essence of the free movement of students in the European 
Union.40 Limitations thereto can only be accepted exceptionally.41 This 
is further borne out by the fact that, apart from in the specific circum-
35 Commission v Austria (n 15) paras 31-35.
36 Bressol (n 17) para 28ff.
37 See also Raulin (n 34) para 34: ‘right to equality of treatment regarding the conditions of 
access to vocational training applies (…) [to] any measure that may prevent the exercise of 
that right’.
38 Bressol (n 17) para 30-32.
39 Forcheri (n 30); Gravier (n 5); Blaizot (n 23); Commission v Belgium (n 4); Humbel (n 25); 
Case C-65/03 Commission v Belgium (diploma requirements) [2005] ECR I-6427; Commissi-
on v Austria (n 15); and Bressol (n 17).
40 Bressol (n 17) para 79.
41 ibid.
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stances of the Bressol case, the Court has never upheld any of the ju-
stifications relied upon by the Member States seeking to restrict access 
of migrant EU nationals. This hostility goes hand in glove with the fact 
that Member States do not seem overly concerned to put forward serious 
attempts at justification,42 and in particular lack evidence to substantiate 
their disparate claims.43 This is in particular illustrated by Commission 
v Austria (diploma requirements) in which Austria only presented some 
rough estimates for specific courses of medicinal studies in defence of its 
generally applicable diploma requirement.44 
The strict approach of the Court was also noticeable in Bressol. Bel-
gium sought to rely, in its defence of quotas allocating places on the 
basis of whether the individual fulfilled certain residency requirements, 
on the necessity of the measure to combat pressure on the education 
budgets caused by the influx of foreign students, the deterioration of the 
quality of the higher education system as a result of overcrowding, and 
the threat posed to the maintenance of a high quality healthcare system. 
The Court, in the end, rejected the financing justification as unfounded45 
and focused on the arguments relating to the maintenance of a high qu-
ality healthcare system.46 Belgium submitted that non-resident students 
crowding out resident students in (para)medical courses offered by the 
educational institutes was likely to lead to a shortage of healthcare pro-
fessionals in the future (implicitly arguing that resident students were 
more likely to stay and take up employment in the French Community 
afterwards). The Court accepted that these concerns could not a priori 
be ruled out, but warned that the link between the maintenance of a 
high quality healthcare system and the education of future healthcare 
professionals was uncertain and somewhat hypothetical in nature.47 It 
then proceeded to lay out an extensive set of evidentiary requirements to 
establish whether the alleged risk to the public health system was in fact 
genuine: the national authorities were to furnish the referring court with 
a comprehensive analysis as to available study places, the (future) need 
for healthcare professionals, and the impact of possible correcting factors 
(eg the movement of health professionals to Belgium should a shortage 
arise, as well as the probability of graduates in Belgium nevertheless le-
42 Consider, for example, Belgium which until Bressol had failed to submit any justifica-
tions for consideration to the Court: see Gravier (n 5); Commission v Belgium (n 4) para 6; 
Case C-47/93 Commission v Belgium [1994] ECR I-1593, para 9; and Commission v Belgium 
(diploma requirements) (n 39) para 30.
43 This seems to be a recurring issue before the Court: N Niamh Shuibhne, ‘Annotation of 
Schwarz, Commission v. Germany and Morgan’ (2008) 45 CML Rev, 771, 781-786.
44 Commission v Austria (n 15), paras 61-65 and in particular para 63.
45 Bressol (n 17) paras 49-51.
46 ibid paras 52-54, 62ff.
47 ibid, para 69.
24 Alexander Hoogenboom: Mobility of students and the financial sustainability of higher ...
aving for jobs abroad).48 Moreover, even where such genuine risks were 
established, the Court admonished the national court to carefully exami-
ne compliance with the principle of proportionality, bearing in mind the 
importance of the principle of access to higher education as the essence 
of the free movement of students, and that any incursion thereupon sho-
uld remain strictly limited.49 As such, whatever the outcome, sufficiently 
wide access to higher education by migrant EU students had to be safe-
guarded.50
It seems, therefore, that Bressol rather confirms the rule of respect 
for equal treatment as regards the conditions of access to education: 
only in very exceptional circumstances, probably limited to the speci-
fic factual situation of the French Community of Belgium and possibly 
Austria,51 and limited primarily to (para)medical studies, will a restric-
tion of that principle be accepted. Consider further that the evidentiary 
barrier is high: the Belgian Constitutional Court in the end only accepted 
the lawfulness of the quota for three courses, holding that for the other 
studies Belgium had failed to adduce sufficient evidence.52 The scope for 
the justification of restrictions in this regard is thus very narrow53 and, 
even where successful, Bressol suggests that some boundaries cannot 
be crossed: at the end of the day, the principle of equal treatment with 
host Member State nationals as regards access to education cannot be a 
hollow one.
2.2 Conditions under which the free movement of students are exer-
cised: study facilitating benefits
The legal regime governing access of migrant EU nationals to study 
facilitating measures offered by Member States is somewhat more diffe-
rentiated in nature. Since Bidar, the main principle here is that individu-
als have the right to equal treatment with host Member State nationals 
48 ibid paras 70-73.
49 ibid paras 75-79.
50 ibid.
51 See for some background information of the situation of Austria and Belgium in this re-
gard S Garben, ‘Case note on 73/08, Bressol, [2010]’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1493, 1495-1499, 
1504.
52 Constitutional Court (Belgium) No 89/2011 of 31 May 2011, reference number 4034 and 
4093, paras B.8.1 – B.8.8.5 (concerning the bachelor in veterinary sciences and bachelor 
physiotherapy and physiotherapy and rehabilitation).
53 See also A-P van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Students and the Protection of National 
Educational Interests: Reflections on Bressol and Chaverot’ (2011) 13 European Journal 
of Migration and Law 123, 130-133. Consider also that the Commission is actively monito-
ring the measures adopted by Belgium and Austria and at present still seems unconvinced 
that the evidentiary requirements laid down by the ECJ in Bressol have been satisfied: 
Commission, ‘Austria and Belgium Given More Time to Justify Quotas’ (Press releases da-
tabase IP/12/1388, 18 December 2012) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
1388_en.htm> accessed 31 December 2013.
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as regards eligibility for study facilitating benefits54 (such as maintenance 
aid in the form of study grants and loans or student travel concessions), 
but the host Member State may limit its duty to show financial solidarity 
with the nationals of other Member States in this regard by only provi-
ding such benefits to those individuals having demonstrated a certain 
degree of integration with (the society of) the host Member State. 
2.2.1 Scope ratione materiae: study facilitating benefits
This category is very much evolving in the case law of the Court and 
still somewhat undefined. Since Bidar, overturning the Court’s judgment 
in Lair and Brown, it is clear that maintenance aid in the form of study 
grants or other forms of (subsidised) loans for study purposes fall within 
the scope of Article 18 TFEU. The recent judgment Commission v Austria 
(student travel concessions) confirms that (state financed) travel conce-
ssions or accommodation for students also fall within this legal regime 
(rather than, for example, the access regime discussed above), but as 
will be seen below, must be distinguished from study grants and loans 
in terms of the integration requirements a Member State can impose on 
the student. Neither category has, as such, been defined by the Court, 
although the Court seems keen on keeping the category ‘study grants or 
loans’ as narrow as possible.55 It remains to be seen how other forms of 
student benefits (or the allowances students are eligible for) are qualified 
in this regard (as ‘study grants’, or as sui generis benefits): some Mem-
ber States56 provide book or food allowances, special student housing, 
or other special grants (eg to reimburse students paying for mandatory 
health insurance policies).57
2.2.2 Who can access study grants in the host Member State I: the EU citi-
zen as ‘pure student’
On the one hand, there are EU citizens who leave their Member State 
of origin to study in another Member State, with no further connections 
with the host State: the ‘pure student’ mentioned above. These individu-
als, while in principle eligible for equal treatment with regard to study 
facilitating benefits, can be required to provide proof of a certain degree of 
integration with the host State before such benefits are provided.
54 This should in principle also include study loans by private lenders where these are 
backed by the Member State such as provided for, eg, in Finland. See Articles 15-16 Opin-
totukilaki 1994/65.
55 Case C-75/11 Commission v Austria (student travel concessions) [2012] (nyr) paras 53-56.
56 See for an overview of the different systems of the 27 Member States and the different be-
nefits they provide students: P Minderhoud, Study Grants in the EU,(European Network on 
Free Movement of Workers: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, 2012) on file with the author.
57 See Commission, ‘Youth on the Move: A Guide to the Rights of Mobile Students in the 
European Union’ (Communication) COM(2010) 477 final  9-11.
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Concerning maintenance aid provided in the form of study grants and 
loans, in Förster58 the Court upheld and found proportional the impo-
sition of a durational residence requirement requiring the migrant EU 
student to have resided in the Netherlands for five years prior to being 
provided with study finance under the Wet studiefinanciering 2000.59 As 
such, the Court ostensibly harmonised its position with that taken by 
the EU legislator in the Citizen’s Rights Directive (CRD):60 Article 24(2) of 
that Directive provides an exception to the principle of equal treatment 
with host Member State nationals formulated in Article 24(1) for mainte-
nance aid for studies, providing that Member States only have to provide 
such grants to individuals having obtained a right to permanent residen-
ce (normally obtained after five years of lawful residence, see Article 16 
CRD).61 Thus, Member States can, as the outer limit, impose a five-year 
residence requirement prior to providing migrant EU students with study 
grants or loans under their respective systems.
At the same time, it may very well be questioned whether the strict 
reliance on, and application of, a durational residence requirement as a 
means to assess a genuine link is still good law. A body of case law of 
the Court seems to be developing which, it is submitted here, requires 
Member States to engage in a more wide-ranging inquiry into the degree 
of integration of the individual with the host State. In D’Hoop,62 ruled in 
2002, the Court held that:
However, a single condition concerning the place where the diploma 
of completion of secondary education was obtained is too general 
and exclusive in nature. It unduly favours an element which is not ne-
cessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection 
between the applicant for the tideover allowance and the geographic 
employment market, to the exclusion of all other representative ele-
ments. It therefore goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objec-
tive pursued.63 
58 Case C-158/07 Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Groep [2008] 
ECR I-8507.
59 ibid paras 45-58.
60 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ  L158/77. See also O Golynker, ‘Case 
Note on Case C-158/07, Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie Beheer Gro-
ep, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 November 2008, not yet reported’, (2009) 
46 CML Rev 2021, 2024-2026.
61 As will be seen below and recognised in Article 24(2) CRD, EU citizens who are workers 
and their family members cannot be made subject to this residence requirement.
62 Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v Office national de l’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191.
63 ibid para 39 (emphasis added).
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More recently, in Stewart,64 the applicant was denied a short-term 
incapacity benefit in youth inter alia because she had not resided in Gre-
at Britain for at least 26 weeks in the 52 weeks immediately preceding 
the claim. The Court ruled that while that requirement, as such, was not 
unreasonable, it was nevertheless too exclusive in nature as it disregar-
ded other elements attaching Stewart to the UK.65 Similarly, in Commi-
ssion v the Netherlands (export of study grants), the Court condemned 
the imposition of the requirement to have resided in the Netherlands for 
at least three years in the six years preceding an application for export 
study finance for a course of study abroad as being ‘too exclusive’.66 This 
trend is strongly confirmed in the recent export of study grant cases, to 
be discussed below.
It would seem to follow that sole reliance on a single genuine link in-
dicator is increasingly becoming a highly questionable practice;67 rather, 
the Court is increasingly insisting on a more individual assessment of the 
circumstances to determine the ‘real and effective degree of connection’.68 
At the same time, it is recognised here that forcing administrative autho-
rities to engage in fully individual assessments, taking into account all 
elements of their integration, may put a great strain on their resources.69 
More importantly, lack of clear and transparent criteria for the asse-
ssment of genuine links, in particular in the context of the sometimes 
muddy waters of administrative practice, may undermine legal certainty 
and result in less awareness of EU citizens of the rights they may be able 
to legitimately claim in a foreign Member State.70
Consider the current example of Austria, in which the Studienförde-
rungsgesetz 1992 provides in Article 4(1) that migrant EU nationals will 
be granted Austrian study grants where such is required by EU law (a 
‘catch-all’ clause). Such a clause handily saves the legislator from having 
64 Case C-503/09 Lucy Stewart v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] (nyr).
65 ibid para 95.
66 Case C-542/09 Commission v the Netherlands [2012] (nyr) para 86.
67 See further: Case C-367/11 Déborah Prete v Office national de l’emploi [2012] (nyr) para 
31; Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln and Iris 
Bucher v Landrat des Kreises Düren [2007] ECR I-9161, paras 34ff, 46; and Case C-258/04 
Office national de l’emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275, para 31ff. While not expli-
citly repeating D’Hoop, the reasoning matches its principles in addition in Case C-499/06 
Halina Nerkowska v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Koszalinie [2008] ECR 
I-3993, para 40ff and Case C-192/05 K Tas-Hagen and RA Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van 
de Pensioen en Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, paras 37-39.
68 Terms used in Stewart (n 64) para 95.
69 Although the Court classically is not sympathetic to such administrative burdens: Case 
104/75 Adriaan de Peijper, Managing Director of Centrafarm BV [1976] ECR 613, para 18.
70 In a more general sense, legal certainty is an important precondition for effective ‘rights’ 
(and their limits) and the freedom to act, see D Chalmers, ‘The Dynamics of Judicial Autho-
rity and the Constitutional Treaty’ (2004) Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, 20. 
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to go through the lengthy process of amendment as the case law of the 
ECJ develops, but at the same time lays the main onus to determine what 
EU law requires in this context with the agency responsible for the imple-
mentation of the law. It will then depend on the make-up of the agency 
and the competence of its staff whether it is capable of determining the 
correct application of EU law in this regard. Moreover, and perhaps more 
cynically, compliance with EU law or a progressive interpretation thereof, 
especially where this leads to great eligibility for foreign students and 
thus more costs, may not be foremost on the agenda of an administrative 
agency faced with increasing pressure, in the light of the economic crisis, 
to balance budgets. Finally, in casu the website of the study grant aut-
hority only sets out very broad and simple guidelines as to when it will 
grant study grants under EU law.71 This makes it difficult for an external 
examiner to determine whether administrative practice is in accordance 
with EU law, as well as for students to know their rights and when they 
can invoke them without consulting an expert. In the light of such prac-
tices, one can imagine that uncertainty would be increased even more if 
the Court were to insist on individual assessments only. 
A final point against solely relying on individual assessments is 
the degree of arbitrariness and denial of (formal) justice that may result 
from treating each case separately and without reference to (generalisa-
ble) principles.72 As such, it is submitted here that a combination of the 
two approaches is perhaps best:73 a set of general, widely disseminated 
and alternative indicative criteria (eg specific periods of residence, ha-
ving obtained a secondary education diploma in the host State74) used 
as a basis for initial assessment and, upon application, an individual 
assessment considering amongst other elements family relations (eg be-
ing married to a host Member State national,75 or being dependent on 
individuals having a connection with the host State76), past periods of 
71 See Österreichische Studienbeihilfenbehörde <http://www.stipendium.at/studienfoer-
derung/studienbeihilfe/wer-hat-anspruch/> accessed 2 November 2013.
72 C O’Brien, ‘Real Links, Abstract Rights and False Alarms: The Relationship Between the 
ECJ’s “Real Link” Case Law and National Solidarity’ (2008) 33(5) European Law Review 643, 
661. She also points out that Court-made ‘policy’ is litigant-led, with the results that legal 
developments in social welfare may be prompted by individuals that are already articulate, 
affluent and can afford sound legal advice rather than by the less fortunate whom social 
welfare is in the end designed to protect. 
73 Recently also endorsed by AG Sharpston in her Opinion in Joined Cases C-523/11 and 
C-585/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v Studentenwerk Heidel-
berg, delivered 21 February 2013, para 106.
74 Considered relevant in Morgan and Bucher (n 67) para 45.
75 Prete (n 67) para 48.
76 Stewart (n 64) para 100.
29CYELP 9 [2013] 15-59
employment77 or residence,78 and/or perhaps (provision of proof of) be-
ing able to speak the language of the host State.79 Overall, therefore, 
there are good reasons to question the validity of the strict application 
of the Förster criterion. In fact, it is submitted here that if Förster came 
before the Court now, it might or should rule differently. Consider that 
Jacqueline Förster had lived in the Netherlands for three years, was in a 
relationship with a Netherlands resident and had worked at a call centre 
and pursued full-time practical training at a Dutch school providing se-
condary special education for pupils with behavioural problems (which 
moreover suggests that she probably spoke near-fluent Dutch). She thus 
seems to be a perfect illustration of someone who has established a link 
with the host State which is not sufficiently reflected in the simple asse-
ssment of the duration of residence in the host State. 
A more integrative, wide-ranging approach is thus much to be pre-
ferred. Moreover, such an approach would give real effect and meaning to 
Union Citizenship as the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States of the EU, and would do greater justice to the right of equal tre-
atment that is intrinsic to that status.80
Concerning travel concessions for students the situation is so-
mewhat different. In Commission v Austria (student travel concessions),81 
the Court for the first time specified that Member States are not free 
in choosing genuine link indicators: rather, regard must be had to the 
constitutive elements, and in particular the nature and purpose, of the 
benefit claimed.82 In casu, the legislation of several Länder tied the receipt 
of (state-financed) student travel concessions to the condition that the 
parents of the student should be in receipt of Austrian child support. 
However, perhaps rightly expecting that the Court would not accept this 
construction,83 Austria relied in the alternative on Article 24(2) of Di-
rective 2004/38 to specify a strict genuine link criterion: student travel 
concessions need only be provided to those individuals having obtained a 
right of permanent residence. The Court was having none of it, however: 
77 As seen in Commission v the Netherlands (n 66) paras 65-66, participation in the labour 
market establishes a (sufficient) link of integration with the host State. Moreover, past em-
ployment was also considered relevant in Nerkowska (n 67) paras 42-43, and in Stewart (n 
64) para 100. Note that past employment relevant for assessing a genuine link with the host 
State should be distinguished from the position of ‘ex-worker’ and the rights attached to 
that status in some cases (including, eg, under some conditions equal treatment as regards 
study grants).
78 Nerkowska (n 67) paras 42-43; and Stewart (n 64) para 101.
79 Joined Cases C-523/11 and C-585/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover and Philipp 
Seeberger v Studentenwerk Heidelberg [2013] (nyr) para 38.
80 See the formulation in Grzelczyk (n 7) para 31.
81 Commission v Austria (student travel concessions) (n 55).
82 ibid para 63.
83 ibid paras 44-50.
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whereas it held that student travel concessions could be seen as main-
tenance aid, the derogation of Article 24(2) only applied to study grants 
and loans, a concept which should be interpreted narrowly.84 Rather, 
having regard to the nature and purpose of the benefit claimed, (proof 
of) enrolment in higher education was a sufficient indicator to establish 
the requisite genuine link between the student and the host State for the 
purposes of claiming the travel concession.85  This judgment has poten-
tially far reaching consequences for a number of Member States which 
have schemes in place to provide students with public transport disco-
unts. These types of concessions may no longer ‘hide’ behind the general 
study grant/loan concept and the (albeit contestable) five-year Förster 
residence criterion. Consider, for example, that the Netherlands offers 
a travel scheme86 for students which is tied to receipt of ‘study finance’ 
under the Wet Studiefinanciering (a mixed study grant/loan system).87 In 
the light of the Commission v Austria judgment, this connection must be 
dropped and all EU national students who have enrolled in a Dutch uni-
versity must be held to be entitled to this travel scheme under the same 
conditions as Dutch nationals. 
2.2.3 Who can access study grants in the host Member State II: the ‘EU 
citizen +’, economically active EU nationals and their family members
With Commission v the Netherlands (export of study grants), the 
Court integrated its long-standing case law as regards the equal tre-
atment rights of economically active EU nationals into its more recent 
jurisprudence concerning EU citizenship. It held, in essence, that econo-
mically active EU nationals are ‘EU citizens +’: they have a right to equal 
treatment with the host Member State nationals (as does any EU citizen) 
as regards social advantages offered by the host Member State, but unli-
ke ‘regular’ EU citizens they must be presumed to have established a 
genuine link with the host Member State as a result of their contribution 
to the host economy.88 Notwithstanding this clear general principle, the 
case law of the Court is quite complex as to who is entitled when. Three 
positions can be distinguished:89
84 ibid paras 53-56.
85 ibid para 63.
86 See Article 3.7 Wet Studiefinanciering 2000: it provides students with free travel during 
either the week or at the weekend and a discount for travel on other days.
87 Articles 3.1 – 3.3 Wet Studiefinanciering 2000.
88 Commission v the Netherlands (n 66) paras 63-66.
89 Note the categories discussed below concern primarily workers and their family mem-
bers. However, following Case C-337/97 CPM Meeusen v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie 
Beheer Groep [1999] ECR I-3289, paras 26-29, the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to self-
employed individuals and their family members.
31CYELP 9 [2013] 15-59
1. The student-worker: the student (enrolled in full-time post-secon-
dary education) with an EU nationality who qualifies as a Union 
worker. Case law suggests that ten hours of remunerated work 
per week in a subordinate relationship of employment is sufficient 
in this regard.90 The fact that a student-worker came to the host 
Member State with the principal intention of studying does not 
disqualify him from obtaining this worker-status.91 This allows 
the student-worker to rely on the principle of non-discrimination 
found in Article 45(2) TFEU, which is further elaborated in Re-
gulation 492/2011. Lair and Brown, as well as the recent case 
LN, confirm that study grants (and scholarships92) constitute a 
social advantage within the meaning of Article 7(2) of what is now 
Regulation 492/201193 and that, as such, student-workers have 
a right to claim such grants under the same conditions as host 
Member State nationals. Additional conditions are prohibited: the 
Member State cannot make the provision of the grant conditio-
nal on the student-worker having completed a minimum period 
of employment prior to the application,94 nor can it impose a re-
sidence requirement95 (allowing frontier workers to claim equal 
treatment in their state of employment). Finally, the ex-worker-
turned-student can continue to rely on his previous worker status 
to claim study allowances where there is continuity between the 
previous employment and the studies subsequently commenced. 
In the case of involuntary unemployment, such continuity is not 
required where the labour market conditions are such as to oblige 
the ex-worker to train in a different field. A further condition for 
ex-worker status is that the (previous) work must not have been 
merely ancillary to the subsequent studies.96
90 See classically Case 139/85 RH Kempf v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1986] ECR 1741 
(12 hours) and recently Case C-14/09 Hava Genc v Land Berlin [2010] ECR I-931, paras 9, 
25-27 (5.5 hours per week may be sufficient). See further: Opinion of AG Geelhoed on Case 
C-413/01 Franca Ninni-Orasche v Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und Kunst 
[2003] ECR I-13187, para 33; and Case C-444/93 Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel 
v Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz, now Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz [1995] 
ECR I-4741, paras 18-20.
91 Case C-46/12 LN v Styrelsen for Videregående Uddannelser og Uddannelsesstøtte [2013] 
(nyr) paras 46-47.
92 Case 235/87 Annunziata Matteucci v Communauté française of Belgium and Commissa-
riat général aux relations internationales of the Communauté française of Belgium [1988] 
ECR I-5589, paras 11-12. Moreover, the basis on which the scholarship was made available 
(in casu, a bilateral treaty) was irrelevant for the application of the principle of equal tre-
atment. 
93 Lair (n 6) paras 22-24; Brown (n 34); and LN (n 91) para 50.
94 Lair (n 6) paras 40-42.
95 Meeusen (n 89) paras 18-25.
96 Brown (n 34) paras 25-27.
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2. The student, a child97 of a Union worker, has two sources of rights: 
Article 10 and Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011. The former is 
activated once three conditions are fulfilled.98 First, the child must 
reside in the Member State in which one of his or her parents is or 
has been employed as a Union worker. Secondly, the child must 
have become installed in the host Member State during the exer-
cise of the right of free movement of workers by either of his or her 
parents. Thirdly, the child must enrol in a form of education. Once 
these factors coincide at some point in time,99 the awesome pro-
tection that is Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 becomes activa-
ted. It provides the child with a self-standing right of residence100 
and full equal treatment as regards benefits facilitating educati-
onal attendance101 (including study grants102) for the purposes of 
continuing his or her education. It is not necessary for the Union 
worker-parent, from whom the right was initially derived, to retain 
his or her status as worker for these rights to remain active; nor 
is it necessary for this parent to even remain in the host Member 
State.103 The age of the child or his or her dependence on the wor-
ker-parent is irrelevant for the purposes of relying on Article 10.104 
The only limitation of Article 10 of Regulation 492/2011 is the 
fact that it requires the residence of the child in the host Member 
State. It does not, therefore, cover the situation of frontier famili-
es, whereby the family resides in Member State A, but the worker-
parent is employed in Member State B. This is where Article 7(2) 
of Regulation 492/2011 comes in: in Bernini, the Court ruled that 
the award of study grants to children of workers constitutes a so-
cial advantage for the worker under that article (even where study 
97 Here, one must be careful not to make reference to the concept of ‘child’ adhered to in 
Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38. Rather, the starting point is simply the individual as 
descendant of the worker or his spouse, regardless of his or her nationality. 
98 See Case C-480/08 Maria Teixeira v London Borough of Lambeth, Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2010] ECR I-1107, paras 44–54, 72-74; and Case C-310/08 London 
Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2010] ECR I-1065, paras 33–43.
99 It is not necessary for the worker-parent to have retained worker status and/or to have 
been employed at the point where the child started his or her education.
100 Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 
ECR I-7091, paras 50-54.
101 Case C-7/94 Landesamt für Ausbildungsförderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v Lubor Gaal 
[1995] ECR I-1031, para 19.
102 Casagrande (n 3) paras 5-8; and Joined Cases 389-390/87 GBC Echternach and A Moritz 
v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1989] ECR 723, paras 33-35.
103 Baumbast (n 100) paras 50-52, 54, 68-74. See also: Echternach and Moritz (n 102) paras 
19-21; Teixeira (n 98) paras 49-50, 53; and Ibrahim (n 98) paras 38-39, 42. 
104 Gaal (n 101) paras 23-30.
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grants are directly granted to the student).105 Meeusen confirmed 
that the position of frontier workers in particular was also cove-
red; the child residing in Member State A can rely on the worker 
status of his or her parent in Member State B to claim equal tre-
atment as regards study grants in the latter Member State.106 At 
the same time, the right is somewhat more limited than Article 10: 
for the right to remain active, the worker-parent must continue to 
support the student and, as Fahmi suggests, the worker-parent 
must continue to have the status of worker in the host State.107 
Further conditions may moreover be imposed, to be discussed be-
low, where the student seeks not to study in the Member State of 
employment of the worker-parent, but rather to export the study 
grants for a course abroad.
3. The family member108 of the Union worker (eg, in particular, the 
spouse or registered partner). For the most part, the relevant 
source of rights providing equal treatment as regards study grants 
for the ‘rest category’ of family members is Article 7(2) of Regu-
lation 492/2011. While the ECJ, to the knowledge of this aut-
hor, has never explicitly confirmed that Article 7(2) of Regulation 
492/2011 can be relied upon by family members (non-children) to 
claim equal treatment as regards study grants, it is nevertheless 
likely that such family members could rely on that Article in the 
light of the broad-ranging case law of the Court interpreting the 
provision.109 Whereas Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 is also an 
option, that right seems to be limited to Union citizens (and the-
ir family members) ‘residing on the basis of this Directive in the 
territory of the host Member’, thereby excluding frontier workers. 
Moreover, the Article is particularly without value to children of 
Union workers who can instead derive more extensive rights from 
other sources.
105 Case C-3/90 MJE Bernini v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECR 
I-1071, paras 24-25.
106 Meeusen (n 89) paras 19-24.
107 Family members of ex-workers can in some circumstances rely on the right of equal 
treatment as regards social advantages where these are intrinsically linked with the ex-
worker’s prior worker status. Maintenance grants for study purposes do not seem to be 
among that category of social advantages: see Case C-33/99 Hassan Fahmi and M Esmoris 
Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank [2001] ECR 2415, paras 
33-47.
108 Reference for the concept of family member can here be made to Article 2 of Directive 
2004/38 which replaces the relevant sections of what used to be Regulation 1612/68 in 
this regard.
109 Implicitly, this can be said to follow from Forcheri (n 30) paras 10–18. In a more general 
sense, one can refer to Case 32/75 Anita Cristini v Société nationale des chemins de fer 
français [1975] ECR 1085.
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2.2.4 Export of study grants 
The case law of the Court as regards the export of study grants is 
still very much an evolving jurisprudence. As a basic point of departure, 
one may distinguish two types of situations in export cases:
- The EU citizen who seeks to export study grants provided by his 
own Member State in order to study abroad.
- The migrant EU citizen, a national of Member State A, who has a 
right to equal treatment with the nationals of host Member State 
B and seeks to export those grants to Member State C.
It should further be mentioned that EU law currently does not con-
fer a right to export such study grants; it is only where the possibility is 
offered by a Member State that the conditions attached to such export 
are scrutinised for compatibility of EU law.110 Many Member States do in 
fact, in line with the Bologna objectives as well as EU initiatives,111 provi-
de for portable study grants, but at the same time have devised various 
conditions seeking to limit the number of eligible persons, targeting both 
their own nationals as well as foreign Member State nationals perceived 
to have only a limited connection with the particular Member State. In 
the past, the Court already had occasion to reject as incompatible with 
EU law the requirement that study grants cannot be exported to the state 
of nationality;112 moreover, a so-called  ‘first stage criterion’ under which 
the portability of study grants under the German scheme was made con-
ditional on the individual in question having completed a year of study 
in a German institution, and subsequently enrolling in a course of study 
that followed up on that initial study period was considered an unjustifi-
ed restriction of free movement rights under Article 21 TFEU.113
Recently popular, however, have been the imposition of (duratio-
nal) residence requirements usually of the variety whereby an individual 
must have lived x out of y years in Member State A before being allowed 
to export those same grants for a course of study offered in an edu-
cational establishment in Member State B. Such requirements affect in 
particular two groups. On the one hand, the residence aspect excludes 
Union frontier workers and their family members from the possibility to 
export study grants offered under the legislation of the Member State 
110 Morgan and Bucher (n 67) paras 22-28. This was recently confirmed explicitly in Case 
C-220/12 Andreas Ingemar Thiele Meneses v Region Hannover [2013] (nyr) para 25; and 
Case C-275/12 Samantha Elrick v Bezirksregierung Köln [2013] (nyr) para 25.
111 See A Schrauwen, ‘Access to and Portability of Student Grants and Loans. Where Tar-
gets Meet Free Movement Law’ (2011) Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
No 2011-38, 3–7.
112 Case C-308/89 Carmina di Leo v Land Berlin [1990] ECR I-4185, para 16.
113 Morgan and Bucher (n 67) paras 22-51.
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of employment. The durational aspect, moreover, also excludes Union 
workers and their family members who have only briefly resided in the 
State of employment. On the other hand, the residence requirement also 
affects the nationals of the Member State who lived some time outside 
its territory.114 Note for migrant EU nationals who are not economically 
active, such residence requirements have little significance. This group 
is in principle, with the caveats noted above, required to reside in the 
host Member State for a period of five years before being eligible for stu-
dy grants there, therewith normally satisfying the requirements for the 
export of study grants as well.
2.2.4.1 EU citizens and their Member State of nationality
The leading case in this regard is the recent Prinz and Seeberger 
case.115 The applicants were two German nationals who fell afoul of the 
requirement imposed by the Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz for the 
financing of studies abroad for the duration of more than one year: in 
such circumstances, the applicants had to have had their permanent re-
sidence116 in Germany for three years prior to the application. Both Prinz 
and Seeberger had spent some time in Germany over the course of their 
lives, and had received some primary (Seeberger) and secondary educa-
tion (Prinz and Seeberger) there. They had also resided over 2.5 years in 
Germany directly prior to their application, in both cases therefore falling 
just short of the three-year requirement.
The Court relied on its classic formula to find a restriction of the 
free movement rights of the applicants: the durational residence requi-
rement was liable to put those Member State nationals having exercised 
their free movement rights at a disadvantage.117 In its defence, Germany 
submitted that the residence requirement was necessary to circumscri-
be the circle of beneficiaries of a study grant to those demonstrating a 
minimum degree of integration with Germany with a view to avoid an 
unreasonable financial burden: a genuine link requirement meant to de-
fine the boundaries of solidarity. The Court, however, rejected the rule 
in principle as being ‘too general and exclusive’ as it did not take into 
account other factors which connected the students to German society, 
finding alternative links in that:
114 Note for migrant EU nationals who are not economically active, such residence requi-
rements have little significance. This group is in principle, with the caveats noted above, 
required to reside in the host Member State for a period of five years before being eligible 
for study grants there, therewith normally satisfying the requirements for export of study 
grants as well.
115 Prinz and Seeberger (n 79). Recently confirmed in substance in Thiele Meneses (n 110).
116 Permanent residence for the purposes of the law was defined as the place where the 
person’s centre of family interest lies. See Prinz and Seeberger (n 79) para 3.
117 ibid para 27.
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(…) the student is a national of the State concerned and was edu-
cated there for a significant period or on account of other factors 
such as, in particular, his family, employment, language skills or the 
existence of other social and economic factors.118
Overall, as already remarked above, the Court here clearly reiterates 
its recent emphasis on a holistic approach to the assessment of whether 
an individual has a ‘genuine link’ with the host Member State: a single 
requirement, in casu one of durational residence, used as an indicator 
measuring integration, is insufficient to capture the whole of the relati-
onship between the individual and a Member State. This will have far-
ranging consequences, as a number of Member States rely on the blanket 
use of durational residence requirements to determine eligibility for their 
exportable study grants.119 This case also reinforces the above conclusion 
that the Förster five-year criterion is probably no longer good law. 
2.2.4.2 ‘EU citizens +’ and durational residence requirements of the host 
State 
After Commission v the Netherlands (export of study grants), it is cle-
ar that durational residence requirements are unlawful where they are 
applied to Union workers and their family members who reside in the host 
Member State. In casu, the Court ruled that a requirement to have resided 
in the Netherlands for three years in the six years preceding the appli-
cation for the export of study grants amounted to indirect discriminati-
on, which, moreover, could not be justified. The first submission by the 
Netherlands had argued that it was legitimate for a Member State to requ-
ire the recipients of such study grants to have a genuine link with that 
State; as seen above, the Court rejected this on the grounds that Union 
workers and their family members by reason of their economic contribu-
tion to the host State had to be presumed to have such a link.120 The se-
cond ground held that the residence requirement was a means to achieve 
certain mobility aims. It had the dual aim of identifying those individuals 
who had been statically residing in one place (symbolised by the require-
ment of immobility for three years in the last six) with a view to providing 
specifically those individuals with a mobility grant, while simultaneously 
seeking to ensure that those having received this mobility grant would 
118 ibid para 38. See also Thiele Meneses (n 110), paras 40-41 where the Court did not exclu-
de the possibility that the applicant in question, who had only attended German schools 
abroad (eg established in Istanbul), could nevertheless be considered sufficiently connected 
to Germany.
119 See for an overview of Member States who apply such measures the table in A Hooge-
nboom, ‘Export of Study Grants and the Lawfulness of Durational Residency Requirements: 
Comments on Case C-542/09, Commission v the Netherlands’ (2012) 14 European Journal 
of Migration and Law 417, 429.
120 Commission v the Netherlands (n 66) paras 60-67.
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after their study period abroad return to the Netherlands (symbolised 
by the condition requiring durational residency in the Netherlands). The 
Court held, somewhat surprisingly in the absence of any evidence offered 
by the Netherlands for the above-mentioned claims, that the residence 
requirement was appropriate to secure both aims.121 However, it rejected 
the necessity of the measure: requiring the fulfilment of specific periods 
of residence risked attaching too much importance to an element not ne-
cessarily representative of the actual degree of attachment.122 
With frontier workers and their family members, the picture is more 
mixed. In Giersch,123 a set of students who were family members of frontier 
workers sought to export their study grants and challenged the lawful-
ness of a residence criterion imposed by Luxembourg (on EU nationals 
and Luxembourg nationals alike) as a condition to receive study grants 
(whether for studies in Luxembourg or abroad) on the basis of Article 
7(2) Regulation 492/2011.124 The Court found the residence criterion to 
constitute indirect discrimination, but was receptive to the ground for ju-
stification put forward by Luxembourg: the latter sought to increase the 
proportion of the population with a higher education degree with a view 
to transition to a knowledge economy.125 The mechanism relied upon was 
similar to the argument by the Netherlands in Commission v the Nether-
lands (export of study grants): residence prior to the studies abroad was 
argued to be a good predictor of future place of residence after the studies 
abroad. The Court’s approach was surprising. 
First, it ended the unquestioning harmonisation of the legal position 
of workers resident in the host State and frontier workers: ‘the frontier 
worker is not always integrated in the Member State of employment in 
the same way as a worker who is resident in that State’.126 Secondly, the 
Court went on to find that indeed the residence requirement was appro-
priate to achieve the aim desired by Luxembourg: students resident in 
Luxembourg prior to the study abroad were, in its view, inherently more 
likely to return there afterwards and integrate into the labour market.127 
On necessity grounds, the rule was rejected, however, with the Court 
121 In other words, that past residence was a relatively good predictor of subsequent place of 
study as well as the propensity to return to the Member State of past residence: Commission 
v the Netherlands (n 66) paras 76-79. AG Sharpston, in contrast, had argued that there was 
no logical link between past residence and propensity to return after studies abroad. See 
Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-542/09 Commission v the Netherlands, delivered on 16 
February 2012, para 147. 
122 Commission v the Netherlands (n 66) para 86.
123 Case C-20/12 Elodie Giersch, Benjamin Marco Stemper, Julien Taminiaux, Xavier Renaud 
Hodin, Joëlle Hodin v Luxembourg [2013] (nyr).
124 See Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case C-20/12 Giersch, delivered on 7 February 2013, para 1.
125 Giersch (n 123) paras 48, 53.
126 ibid para 65.
127 ibid para 67.
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adopting similar reasoning to that above: the use of a sole criterion as de-
terminative of the degree of attachment of an individual to the host Mem-
ber State risked disregarding other links with the host State. In particu-
lar, the Court criticised the criterion for excluding the situation where the 
student resides abroad but studies in Luxembourg, where the parents of 
the child live in Luxembourg and support the child residing abroad and, 
finally, for excluding the children of migrant workers who have worked in 
Luxembourg for a significant period of time.128 With regard to the latter, 
the ‘pure frontier family’ (all family members live abroad), the Court held 
that Luxembourg could make the grant of maintenance aid for study 
purposes conditional on the completion of a minimum duration of em-
ployment of the frontier-worker parent before the study grants had to be 
granted to the child and seemed to suggest, with reference to Article 24(2) 
juncto 16 Directive 2004/38, that a five year period would be appropriate 
in the context of study grants.129 Finally, and technically obiter dictum, 
the Court also helpfully pointed to some other tools at the disposal of 
Luxembourg in this regard. It could, for instance, introduce anti-cumu-
lation provisions whereby the aid provided by Luxembourg would be re-
duced by the amount received in another Member State. Or, somewhat 
shockingly, the Court suggested that Luxembourg, in essence, could in-
troduce a financial incentive or penalty (depending on one’s position) to 
enforce the return of the study grant recipient to Luxembourg to take up 
employment there (eg a system whereby an initial study loan would only 
be converted to a grant upon such return).130
Combining Commission v the Netherlands (export of study grants) 
and Giersch, we see a number of interesting points. As seen, frontier 
workers are no longer unquestionably to be harmonised with resident 
Union workers; a ruling by which the Court in essence partly overturned 
its Meeusen rule.131 In fact, the Court seems to have constructed a certain 
hierarchy. At the top stands the fully migrated Union worker and his or 
her family members. Here exists (at the very least) a dual link with the 
host Member State: residence and the contribution to the host economy/
public purse as a result of the employment. Here a Member State is requ-
ired to provide for equal treatment with the host Member State nationals 
as regards social advantages without further questioning. 
On the bottom rung stands the pure frontier worker and his or her 
family members. Here the connection of the ‘host’ Member State is redu-
ced to a single link: that of the employment of the Union worker. Giersch 
confirms that in such circumstances Member States can require, per-
128 ibid para 75.
129 ibid paras 78-80.
130 See ibid para 79.
131 Meeusen (n 89) paras 19-24.
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haps for all social advantages to be enjoyed in the state of employment, a 
degree of ‘strength’ of that single link. This may be assessed by determi-
ning, for example, whether the individual is engaged in more than minor 
employment132 or has been employed in the host State for a number of 
years (as seen above). 
The middle ground is occupied by the Union worker and his or her 
family that have a diffuse set of links with the host State. The basis is 
again formed by employment in the host State, but a number of other 
links must also be considered, such as whether part of the family lives in 
the host State or studies there.133 Where such a multitude of links exist, 
it is likely that the ‘strength’ of the employment link becomes less deter-
minative for the right to equal treatment as regards social advantages in 
the State of employment to arise. Here, the Member State has less free-
dom to impose conditions of prior employment and the like: in essence its 
discretion is, or should be, limited to merely establishing the existence of 
links beyond mere employment.134 
Three criticisms can, however, be levelled against the judgment of 
the Court in Giersch. First, the Court accepted the proposed ‘social objec-
tive’ of Luxembourg too easily. In the light of the overall EU objective of 
increasing the number of tertiary diploma holders, it held that: ‘an action 
undertaken by a Member State in order to ensure that its resident popu-
lation is highly educated and to promote the development of the economy 
pursues a legitimate objective which can justify indirect discrimination 
on grounds of nationality’.135 This does sound like a reasonable objective, 
but in the context of the case it is questionable: what action did Luxem-
bourg undertake in this regard? One can perhaps assume that the Court 
meant to refer to the introduction of the possibility to export study grants 
in order to attend higher education abroad  in a general sense (in view, 
also, of the lack of higher education opportunities in Luxembourg itse-
lf). Fine, but this does not explain or justify the residence requirement 
circumscribing the beneficiaries of exportable study grants: it seems to 
this author very difficult to make an argument that this requirement, 
specifically, contributes to the aim of increasing the number of residents 
in possession of a tertiary degree. Why would the introduction or the 
existence of such a requirement, as a prerequisite for study grants, in-
duce a greater number of individuals to settle in Luxembourg after their 
studies than the absence of such a requirement?
132 See Case C-212/05 Gertraud Hartmann v Freistaat Bayern [2007] ECR I-6303, para 34ff; 
and Case C-213/05 Wendy Geven v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [2007] ECR I-6347, para 
25ff.
133 Giersch (n 123) para. 75.
134 ibid para 75.
135 ibid para 56.
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Rather, the residence requirement, as was submitted in Commission 
v the Netherlands, is either meant to limit the circle of beneficiaries to 
those who are sufficiently integrated with a view ‘to avoid an unreasona-
ble financial burden which could have consequences for the very existen-
ce of the assistance scheme’136 and/or to safeguard the ‘investment’ made 
in mobile students (whereby resident students are deemed as somehow 
inherently likely to return to contribute to economic and social life in 
Luxembourg).137 It is the latter point that the Court focuses on in Giersch, 
which is however not related to the social objective that Luxembourg 
claimed. Considering the potentially important implications of this case 
for both the legal position of frontier workers, as well as for recipients of 
study grants (see the discussion as regards the return obligation below) 
this flawed reasoning of the Court is regrettable and confuses the context 
in which the legal principles are developed. 
A second point relates to the hierarchical scheme created by the 
Court in Giersch ranging from resident Union workers and their family 
members to the pure frontier family. In the past, the Court quite consi-
stently insisted on the harmonisation of the position of the latter with 
that of the former when it came to claiming benefits in the Member State 
of employment. This also makes sense in the light of the underlying lo-
gic of the Court referred to above: a migrant EU worker who has helped 
finance the social benefits he claims is in principle entitled (‘sufficiently 
integrated’) to receive them. 
The danger of this approach is that the frontier worker may become 
a distinctly unattractive position. As O’Brien puts it, frontier work in the 
EU is both ‘the apotheosis of free movement and the anomalous excep-
tion to the principle of social integration’.138 Giersch further compounds 
this tension: because of the Court-sanctioned possibility of Member Sta-
tes to impose durational work requirements, a Union frontier worker may 
end up in a situation, at least initially, whereby neither the Member State 
of residence (because the Union frontier worker and his migrant family 
are not (yet) sufficiently integrated) nor the Member State of employment 
(for the first x amount of working years) is obliged to provide certain soci-
136 Commission v the Netherlands (n 66) para 56.
137 See also the argument submitted by Luxembourg as summarised in the Opinion of AG 
Mengozzi in Case C-20/12 Giersch, delivered 7 February 2013, para 38 and in the order for 
reference, para 29 available at <http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/
ecer/import/hof_van_justitie/nieuwe_hofzaken_inclusief_verwijzingsuitspraak/2012/c-
020-12-verwijzingsbs.pdf> accessed 2 November 2013.
138 C O’Brien, ‘Case C-212/05, Gertraud Hartmann v. Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of the 
Grand Chamber of 18 July 2007 nyr; Case 213/05, Wendy Geven v. Land Nordrhein-We-
stfalen, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 18 July 2007 nyr; Case 287/05, D.P.W. Hendrix 
v. Raad van Bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, Judgment of 
the Grand Chamber of 11 September 2007’ (2008) 45 CML Rev 499, 499-501.
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al advantages (such as study grants).139 Thus, in the absence of a default 
responsible Member State, a large group of EU citizens (some 780,000140) 
may fall between two stools where it concerns benefits provided on the 
basis of solidarity, such as study grants. It would thus perhaps be better 
for the Court to return to its previous line of case law. The concerns of 
‘abuse’ (such as study grant forum shopping) raised by the Member Sta-
tes should not be overstated: it is highly unlikely that the worker-parent 
would change his or her place of employment to another Member State 
solely in order to claim social assistance there, such as study grants, for 
his or her dependent child. 
Finally, a point should be made as regards the fact that the Court 
in Giersch seemed to suggest that a ‘return obligation’, complete with 
measures for its enforcement, for students provided with exportable stu-
dy grants would be allowed.  Here we see the Court endorsing a direct 
form of reciprocity: maintenance aid for study purposes is only provided 
(or only provided under favourable conditions) as a quid pro quo for the 
expected contribution of the person so subsidised to the economy of the 
subsidising Member State. This return obligation, and its underlying lo-
gic, should be rejected in the strongest possible terms. 
In a basic sense, the return obligation violates the central tenets 
of an internal market characterised by free factor movement. After all, 
following Giersch, Member States may require the availability to the na-
tional labour market of the student who was invested in (by penalising 
those who do not return). This is surely a direct contradiction of the free 
movement of workers (and/or freedom of establishment), the essence of 
which is that a Member State national should be able to move to any 
Member State where the demand for his or her skills is highest.141 This 
in fact amounts to the repartitioning of the European labour market into 
national labour markets. There is also a strong moral aspect: if financi-
al support is provided for a student, does this then entitle society, as a 
right, to benefit from this person’s labour and/or presence? This buying 
of a ‘stake’ in a person’s life and productive capacity seems, to put it 
mildly, highly questionable.142 Moreover, it has problematic social justice 
implications as the obligation is regressive in nature: it is most likely to 
affect those most needing financial support, lower to middle class stu-
dents. This damaging effect is reinforced if students are in essence forced 
139 See this problem also in the Opinion of AG Pergola in Case C-337/97 Meeusen [1999] 
ECR I-3289, paras 15-20 and the facts underlying that case.
140 G Nerb et al, ‘Scientific Report on the Mobility of Cross-Border Workers within the EU-
27/EEA/EFTA Countries’ (Final Report 2009) VII (2009), 16–27 <http://ec.europa.eu/so-
cial/BlobServlet?docId=3459&langId=en> accessed 2 November 2013.
141 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2011) 582.
142 For an extensive discussion, see S Dumitru, ‘Skilled Migration: Who Should Pay for 
What? A Critique of the Bhagwati Tax’ (2012) 14(1) Diversities 9, 13-16.
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to look across borders because the domestic higher education system 
does not offer the desired course of study (as is assuredly the case in 
Luxembourg).143 Finally, more practically, one may wonder how long the 
student in question is required to be ‘available to the national labour 
market’. Would this be linked to the number of years that he or she re-
ceived financing, or the amount? Either way, this may generate a strong 
lock-in effect for the student as regards an initial study choice (where he 
or she would prefer a different one) for fear of generating a greater work 
obligation towards the home State in this regard, quite separate from or 
in addition to any repayment obligation of study loans that may exist in 
any case. In addition, what happens if the national labour market is sa-
turated or the particular skills of the student are not in demand? Is the 
student then forced to choose between unemployment and a financial 
penalty?
Overall, it would seem that a return obligation is an ill-advised 
mechanism, raising a host of legal, moral and practical issues. A Mem-
ber State would do better to pursue labour market policies designed to 
attract foreign talent (the carrot) rather than trying to shepherd its stray 
students back to their home coral by means of a stick. 
2.3 Conclusion: the case law of the Court on student mobility and 
its consequences
The above discussion has revealed that the case law of the Court of 
Justice on student mobility has grown extensively over the last 40 years 
or so. It would seem fair to conclude that the legal principles developed 
have strongly contributed to an increased mobility of students in the EU 
by providing mobile learners with extensive rights both as regards access 
to education offered abroad as well as vis-à-vis study facilitating benefits 
offered by the host or home State. However, the discussion (at least im-
plicitly) has also revealed increasing concern, particularly noticeable in 
recent cases, on the part of the Member States as regards the (alleged) 
negative financial and economic consequences of student mobility. These 
worries include the increased pressure on the public purse as regards the 
financing of higher education institutes generated by the influx of foreign 
EU students (at issue, inter alia, in Bressol). As will be seen below, such 
concern is not fully baseless: the ‘Member State subsidy’, the difference 
between the tuition fee paid by the student and the actual cost of educa-
ting the student, is in many EU countries extensive and must, as seen, 
also be extended to migrant EU nationals. In addition, renewed attempts 
by the Member States to limit eligibility for study grants of student-wor-
kers (such as in the case of LN referred to above), as well as the export 
143 See also Case C-20/12 Giersch [2013] (nyr) para 60.
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cases in which Member States package their attempts to justify their im-
posed restrictions in terms of a fear of a collapse of the study assistance 
scheme or with a view to safeguard a return on the portable study grants 
provided, show that economic concerns play an ever large role in policy-
making in this regard. Coupled with a context of a still on-going ‘sove-
reign debt crisis’ in which Member States are under increasing pressure 
to get their public accounts in order, it is not surprising that the longer 
running discussion regarding the (allocation of the) financial responsibi-
lities of Member States for the free moving student in the European Uni-
on has acquired new urgency. However, the debate in this regard is often 
characterised by myriad unsubstantiated claims: it is easy to argue that 
educating the foreign student must cost the host State ‘something’, and 
that this constitutes a burden that cannot be extended indefinitely,144 but 
what about the (potential) benefits? It is to this issue that we now turn, in 
an attempt to clarify the sometimes rather murky discussion. 
3.  Student mobility in times of economic crisis: luxury product or 
necessity? 
Public spending on tertiary education in the EU 27 averages about 
1.1% of GDP145 (some €140 billion146) and services some 20 million stu-
dents (a number which is rising).147 Moreover, the unit cost of a student 
in tertiary education (estimated at €9,400 per annum) is the highest of all 
educational levels148 and is borne almost entirely by the public purse: pri-
vate spending on education remains marginal as a source of funding.149 
Coupled with an increasingly mobile student population numbering 
about half a million individuals capable of claiming equal treatment both 
as regards access to education and study facilitating benefits, concern 
with regard to the direction and size of student flows seems at least prima 
facie justified. As such, the question whether Member States can invoke 
undue pressure on their public finances as a ground for justification for 
the imposition of, for example, differential tuition fees (to limit the influx 
of foreign students) or attaching restrictive conditions to portable study 
grants (to limit the circle of beneficiaries of such grants, or to enforce the 
144 See eg P Hilpold, ‘Hochschulzugang und Unionsbürgerschaft’ (2005) 21 EuZW 647, 652.
145 Key Data on Education in Europe (EACEA P9 Eurydice, 2012) 87-88.
146 Calculated from GDP data. Eurostat - Tables, Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) <http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do;jsessionid=9ea7d07d30db67510c7e
4c7c4049b1dff3ee9bbfcd7b.e34MbxeSaxaSc40LbNiMbxeNaxuSe0?tab=table&plugin=1&p
code=tec00001&language=en> accessed 2 November 2013.
147 See Eurostat - Data Explorer <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.
do?dataset=educ_enrl5&lang=en> accessed 2 November 2013.
148 Key Data on Education in Europe (n 145) 91-92.
149 ibid 93ff.
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return of students after their studies abroad) warrants serious conside-
ration.150
3.1 The case against
It is an accepted truth that ‘economic justifications’ are rejected at 
the outset by the Court as incapable of constituting ‘pressing reasons 
of public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom gu-
aranteed by the Treaty’.151 This is not surprising, as such attempts at 
derogation or justification go against the very core of the functioning and 
establishment of the internal market: free/unrestricted movement of the 
factors of production leads (in the long term) to an optimal allocation 
of scarce resources, boosting economic efficiency and in turn impelling 
greater consumer welfare; measures that seek to restrict free movement 
for economic reasons may lead to short-term gain for the Member State 
imposing them, but overall a ‘dead weight loss’ of welfare occurs. 
However, this internal market ideal is premised on the free move-
ment of production factors, that is to say (in this context), mobile econo-
mically active persons (eg workers responding to an offer of employment 
in another Member State). In contrast, student mobility is at least ini-
tially an example of mobility of EU citizens sec, with no or only a limi-
ted economic nexus. Notwithstanding this, the contribution of student 
mobility to the economies of both the ‘sending State’ and of the ‘hosting 
State’, as well as the EU economy as a whole, is significant and should 
not be underestimated. There is thus a certain economic logic to promo-
ting student mobility, not as a luxury in good times, but as a necessity to 
promote economic growth in good and bad times.
To see this, it is necessary to explain some of the dynamics un-
derlying endogenous growth theory, which emphasises economic growth 
as a function of a virtuous cycle of and interaction between human 
capital,152 innovation and knowledge/technology.153 This theory suggests 
150 The focus here is on economic arguments for and/or against student mobility. It should 
be recognised, however, that student mobility may also have a wide range of other benefits, 
such as a strengthened sense of European identity and citizenship, mutual learning and 
cultural exchange. See the Report of the High Level Expert Forum on Mobility, June 2008 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/doc/2008/mobilityreport_en.pdf> accessed 2 November 
2013. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these elements in detail.
151 Case C-109/04 Karl Robert Kranemann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [2005] ECR I-2421 
para 34.
152 Human capital in this context refers to the stock of knowledge, skills and attributes 
(innate or acquired through formal and informal learning processes) that affect productivity 
as a means to produce economic value: K Dae-Bong, ‘Human Capital and its Measurement’ 
(3rd OECD World Forum on Statistics, Knowledge and Policy, Korea 37-30 October 2009) 
1-4 <http://www.oecd.org/site/progresskorea/44109779.pdf> accessed 2 November 2013.
153 See for the main proponents of this theory P Romer, ‘Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in 
Economic Development’ (1993) 32 Journal of Monetary Economics 543; R Lucas, ‘On the 
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that greater educational attainment and skills training is beneficial for the 
individual, industries and the (national) economy as a whole as its boosts 
productivity and brings with it a range of positive externalities. This holds 
true in particular for tertiary education attainment: there is a broad body 
of evidence that shows an association between tertiary education and 
labour productivity, higher wages and lower risk of unemployment;154 
at industry level, the skills level of the work force was also found to be 
determinative in increasing output per worker155 and, finally, at the ma-
cro level, the OECD Education at a Glance 2012 EU Country Note finds 
that 2/3 of GDP growth in 21 EU countries is due to (the income growth 
of) individuals possessing tertiary qualifications.156 Moreover, in terms of 
positive externalities, the literature suggests that highly skilled workers 
contribute to innovation and technology adoption which increases the 
productivity of other workers and physical capital innovation processes 
associated with highly skilled workers.157 Overall, it seems relatively clear 
that tertiary education attainment in the EU is a crucial factor for futu-
re economic development and economic growth. The question remains, 
however, what student mobility contributes in this regard. It does so, 
arguably, in two related ways. 
Mechanics of Economic Development’ (1988) 22 Journal of Monetary Economics 3; J Min-
cer, Schooling, Experiences and Earnings, (Columbia University Press 1974); and G Becker, 
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education 
(University of Chicago Press 1993) 15ff. For some initial empirical evidence to support this, 
see J Barro, ‘Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries’ (1991) 106(2) Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 407.
154 A Chevalier et al, The Returns to Higher Education Teaching (Centre for the Economics 
of Education, 2002) 38-55 <http://cee.lse.ac.uk/pubs/The_Returns_to_Higher_Educati-
on_Teaching.pdf> accessed2 November 2013; C Harmon et al, ‘The Returns to Education: 
Microeconomics’ (2003) 17(2) Journal of Economic Surveys 115; and OECD Education At A 
Glance (OECD Publishing 2012) 118-161.
155 R Wilson and G Briscoe, ‘The Impact of Human Capital on Economic Growth: A Review 
in P Descy and M Tessaring (eds), Impact of Education and Training, Third Report on Vocati-
onal Training Research in Europe: Background Report (CEDEFOP Reference Series 54 2004) 
35-36; and F Scherer and K Hue, ‘Top Managers’ Education and R&D Investment’ (1992) 
21(6) Research Policy 507.
156 OECD Education at a Glance 2012: OECD Indicators Country Note – European Union 
1-3 <http://www.oecd.org/education/EAG2012%20-%20Country%20note%20-%20Euro-
pean%20Union.pdf> accessed 2 November 2013.
157 See R Lucas, ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’ (1988) 22 Journal of Mo-
netary Economics 3, 39; N Stokey, ‘Human Capital, Product Quality and Growth’ (1991) 
106(2) Quarterly Journal of Economics 587, 587-588, 627. See eg P Romer ‘Endogeneo-
us Technological Change’ (1990) 98(5) Journal of Political Economy 871; and J Vande-
nbussche et al, ‘Growth, Distance to Frontier and Composition of Human Capital’ (2006) 
11(2) Journal of Economic Growth 97. See further, P Aghion et al, ‘The Causal Impact of 
Education on Economic Growth: Evidence from the United States’ (Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2009) 4, 33-39 <http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/
Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2009_spring_bpea_papers/2009_spring_bpea_aghion_etal.pdf 
> accessed 2 November 2013.
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The first is the allocation argument. It runs as follows: in the cla-
ssic economic sense, a rational (prospective) student engages in a cost/
benefit analysis when deciding how much education to obtain. On one 
side of the scale lie the costs of studying, ranging from having to pay tu-
ition fees, ensuring availability of subsistence resources and the oppor-
tunity costs of studying, but also less quantifiable costs such as, for 
example, the mental effort expended. On the other side are the benefits 
incentivising greater skills acquisition: the wage premium attached to 
highly skilled vocations and other factors mentioned above (eg lower risk 
of unemployment), the (possible) pleasure derived from studying and/or 
the increased quality of life that is linked with higher educational atta-
inment.158 In this model, the student will continue to obtain education to 
the point where the marginal benefit of obtaining one more year of higher 
education equals the marginal cost.159
Within an increasingly integrated EU internal market, such cost-be-
nefit analysis arguably no longer takes place solely with reference to the 
national education and labour market; rather, a student may look for a 
new optimum, taking into account the relative shortage of skills abroad 
(and thus, for example, the higher wage premium, work opportunities 
and possibility for career development) or the availability of better qua-
lity or better matching (to the cognitive ability of the individual) educa-
tion abroad. At the same time, other costs relating specifically to foreign 
studies such as regulatory barriers (eg non-recognition of degrees), the 
financial costs of moving or the emotional costs of leaving friends and 
family are also weighed in.160 It follows that an important factor in the 
decision to study abroad is thus the attractiveness of the foreign labour 
market. As such, the allocation argument sees student mobility as an im-
portant predictor of (future) highly skilled migration:161 the choice to study 
abroad is influenced by the desire to work abroad. Thus, by promoting 
student mobility, the (regional) allocation of highly skilled individuals in 
the EU is optimised, leading to efficient use of present skills. Moreover, it 
also boosts, indirectly, incentives for greater skill attainment both becau-
se the return on skills attainment abroad may be higher and because the 
158 W McMahon, Higher Learning, Greater Good (John Hopkins University Press 2009) 42, 
43, 51, 69ff.
159 Barr furthermore argues that the aggregate decision-making of students deciding on 
whether and how much tertiary education to obtain leads to an efficient outcome for soci-
ety as the market conditions necessary for decentralised decision-making hold true. See N 
Barr, Economics of the Welfare State (OUP 2012) 301-302, 305-307, 328-329.
160 See also D Guellec and M Cervantes, ‘International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: 
From Statistical Analysis to Policy Formulation’ in OECD International Mobility of the Highly 
Skilled (OECD Proceedings, 2001) 79-83, who discuss the ‘pull and push’ factors affecting 
highly skilled migration flows. 
161 Student migration as a channel for highly skilled migration is relatively well established 
in the literature: K Tremblay, ‘Academic Mobility and Immigration’ (2005) 9 Journal of Stu-
dies of International Education 196, 201ff. 
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student will need to distinguish himself in order to be competitive in the 
host labour market.162 
This is also borne out in practice. There is a broad range of studies 
which find that mobile students are more likely to work abroad and that 
the host Member State can thus benefit from a relatively high ‘conversion 
rate’ (student-to-worker).163  The benefit thereof should not be underesti-
mated: a recent study carried out by the Dutch Central Planning Agency 
found that foreign EU students in the Netherlands (a net recipient coun-
try, see below) generated an estimated net benefit of €652 million a year 
to public finances as a result, primarily, of students staying to work after 
their studies.164 As such, the ‘free-rider’ argument frequently invoked by 
Member States, whereby mobile students are depicted as locusts who 
merely consume education in the host State without contributing to the 
maintenance thereof, seems unjustified. At the same time, it should be 
stressed that there seems to be no evidence of brain drain: the Member 
State of origin can also benefit, inter alia, through the formation of bu-
siness and academic networks, remittances, return of students after a 
period abroad with new skills, and induced higher skill attainment.165 
A healthy ‘brain circulation’166 thus seems to take place within the EU, 
egged on by student mobility.
A second argument is the value added or enrichment role of stu-
dent mobility. Rather than merely functioning as a facilitator or chain in 
highly skilled migration, student mobility may generate certain benefits 
all of itself:
162 See generally for the benefits of ensuring optimal allocation of the (highly skilled) workfor-
ce of the EU through the mechanisms of free movement: H Bonin et al, ‘Geographic Mobility 
in the European Union: Optimising its Social and Economic Benefits’ (IZA Research Report 
No 19, 2008) 52-60.
163 U Teichler and V Jahr, ‘Mobility During the Course of Study and After Graduation’ 
(2001) 36(4) European Journal of Education 443, 456-457. See for further development 
of this study: H Schomburg and U Teichler, Higher Education and Graduate Employment 
in Europe: Results from Graduate Surveys from Twelve Countries, (Springer 2006) 49-50, 
77-78, 119-128. See also M Parey and F Waldinger, ‘Studying Abroad and the Effect on 
International Labour Market Mobility: Evidence from the Introduction of Erasmus’ (2010) 
121 The Economic Journal 194, 217ff; and H Oosterbeek and D Webbink, ‘Does Studying 
Abroad Induce a Brain Drain?’ (2011) 78 Economica 347, 361-364.
164 Calculated from CPB Notitie of 18 April 2012, The economische effecten van interna-




accessed 2 November 2013.
165 See for an overview F Docquier and H Rapoport, ‘Globalization, Brain Drain and Deve-
lopment’ (IZA Discussion Paper No 5590, 2011). 
166 See further: J Salt, ‘International Movement of the Highly Skilled’ (1997) OECD Occasio-
nal Paper No 3 5, 23-25; L Ackers, ‘Moving People and Knowledge: Scientific Mobility in the 
European Union’ (2005) 43(5) International Migration 99, 100-101, 120ff.
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1. The main argument in this respect is that mobile students may 
perform better than non-mobile students in an increasingly glo-
balised labour market. This is so in part because there is a strong 
correlation between student mobility and the propensity to en-
gage in advanced study (an increase in the quantity of education 
and thus human capital accumulation/skill levels)167 and in part 
because study abroad also adds an extra quality dimension to 
the educational attainment: such students benefit from having 
experienced more than one educational and cultural tradition en-
gendering the need for greater adaptability/flexibility and develop 
a range of soft skills such as language skills, cultural sensitivity 
and a degree of independence which is linked to greater creativity 
and innovation processes.168
2. Secondly, there is the argument that a mobile student populati-
on with the rights of equal treatment as regards access to higher 
education institutes and (under certain circumstances) access to 
study grants (either from the home or host Member State) crea-
tes competitive pressures on universities. These universities now 
have to compete not only with universities within that Member 
State, but also with those located in other Member States for the 
EU talent pool as a whole. This pushes universities to utilise their 
resources efficiently, engage in processes of internationalisation 
and quality improvement169 and increase investment in research 
activities in order to improve their reputation and ranking with 
a view to attract high potentials.170 These processes then benefit 
both foreign and domestic students.
Overall, therefore, there seem to be good reasons, similar to those 
that apply to the free movement of the factors of production that is the 
167 See O Bracht et al, ‘The Professional Value of ERASMUS Mobility’ (2006) Final Report 
to the Commission – DG Education and Culture xiv <http://ec.europa.eu/education/era-
smus/doc/publ/evalcareer.pdf>; U Teichler and K Janson, ‘The Professional Value of Tem-
porary Study in Another European Country: Employment and Work of Former ERASMUS 
Students’ (2007) 11 Journal of Studies in International Education 486, 488-492.
168 Bracht (n 167) chs 3-5 and 211ff; and J Ritzen and G Marconi, ‘Internationalization in 
European Higher Education’ (2011) 3(2) International Journal of Innovation Science 83, 
89-90. See also V Papatsiba, ‘European Higher Education Policy and the Formation of 
Entrepreneurial Students as Future European Citizens’ (2009) 8(2) European Educational 
Research Journal 189, 190-192.
169 See S Reichert and C Tauch, ‘Trends IV: European Universities Implementing Bologna’ 
(EUA Publications 2005) 28-33; A Sursock and H Smidt, ‘Trends 2010: A Decade of Change 
in European Higher Education’ (EUA Publications 2010) 72ff; and P Altbach and U Teichler, 
‘Internationalization and Exchanges in a Globalized University’ (2001) 5(1) Journal of Stu-
dies in International Education 5. 
170 L Mechtenberg and R Strausz, ‘The Bologna Process: How Student Mobility Affects Mul-
ti-cultural Skills and Educational Quality’ (2008) 15 International Tax and Public Finance 
109, 109-112, 123-125; and M Delpierre and B Verheyden, ‘Student and Worker Mobility 
under University and Government Competition’ (2011) CESifo Working Paper No 3415, 2-3.
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basis for the establishment of the common market, why economically 
inspired justifications should continue to be rejected where these impede 
student mobility. Such obstacles cast their shadow forward and impede 
the mobility of the highly skilled in the European Union in response to 
shifting demand patterns, forsake knowledge attainment and the acqui-
sition of important skills that could be obtained by students who are mo-
bile, thereby hampering innovation and economic integration processes, 
and remove competitive constraints from universities and therewith the 
benefits that such competition could engender. 
3.2 The case for 
Since student mobility contributes to generating economic growth 
for the Member States involved and the EU as a whole, the case for a 
restriction of student mobility on economic or budgetary grounds is a 
difficult one to make. However, while the benefits may be universal, the 
burden of shouldering the costs of student mobility is unevenly divided 
due to the application of general principles regarding the rights of free 
movement and equal treatment of students to differently situated Mem-
ber States. The first main variable to consider in this regard is the relative 
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Belgium 35.1 10.6 24.5 5.5%
Bulgaria 7.8 24.5 -16.7 -5.8%
Czech Republic 25.9 12.2 13.7 3.1%
Denmark 17.6 5.5 12.1 5%
Germany 129.7 92.2 37.5 1.5%
Estonia 2.1 3.9 -1.8 -2.6%
Ireland 10.3 24.7 -14.4 -7.4%
Greece 15.3 33.5 -18.2 -2.8%
Spain 27.6 19.3 8.3 0.4%
France 46.3 51.8 -5.5 -0.25%
Italy 16.8 46.7 -29.9 -1.5%
Cyprus 1.9 25.7 -23.8 -73.9%
171 Data used for calculations obtained from EUROSTAT 2010 values of tps00064 and 
tps00062 <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/education/data/main_
tables> accessed 2 November 2013.
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Latvia 0.7 5.3 -4.6 -4.1%
Lithuania 0.3 10.5 -10.2 -5.1%
Luxembourg 2.3 7.4 -5.1 -94%
Hungary 11.0 9.0 2 0.5%
Malta 0.0 2.2 -2.2 -0.5%
Netherlands 36.0 14.9 21.1 3.2%
Austria 52.1 12.8 39.3 11.2%
Poland 5.4 33.9 -28.5 -1.3%
Portugal 3.8 19.8 -16 -4.2%
Romania 3.9 40.0 -36.1 -3.6%
Slovenia 1.4 2.6 -1.2 -1%
Slovakia 7.1 31.5 -24.4 -10.4%
Finland 3.8 8.6 -4.8 -1.6%
Sweden 12.8 15.4 -2.6 -0.6%
United 
Kingdom 186.4 14.5 171.9 6.9%
It should not surprise us that many of the ‘usual suspects’ in student 
mobility cases correspond to the largest net receivers of students in the 
European Union. The relatively crude calculation done above gives no in-
dication as to the regional spread or the spread across different courses. 
As such, there may be something in the bumbling attempts of Belgium 
and Austria in seeking to limit access to education and the Netherlands 
and Germany in attempting to circumscribe the group of eligible students 
for study facilitating benefits in the various cases having come before the 
Court of Justice. At the same time, quite a few Member States (eg Bulga-
ria, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, as well as Luxembourg and Cyprus) have 
a large outflow of students. These Member States may, on the one hand, 
benefit doubly as they gain from the economic benefits set out above and 
can free-ride on the higher education infrastructure of other Member Sta-
tes. On the other hand, however, at least in the short run, these Member 
States may be concerned that the mobile students who are provided with 
mobility grants do not always return from their studies abroad.
A second important variable is the different approaches to the finan-
cing and organisation of the higher education systems in the Member 
States of the EU. These can, arguably, be grouped as points on a scale 
clustered around three different conceptions of the student enrolled in 
tertiary education. 
At one end we have the ‘student as investor’.172 This conception is 
modelled on the idea that the market is the main (decentralised) organiser 
and financer of the higher education system and guides the decision-ma-
172 S Schwarz and M Rehburg, ‘Study Costs and Direct Public Student Support in 16 Euro-
pean Countries –Towards a European Higher Education Area?’ (2004) 39 European Journal 
of Education 521, 531.
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kers at the points of supply (the higher education institutes) and demand 
(the student) towards an efficient outcome. Producer and consumer so-
vereignty is key. Producers, in addition to academic freedom, should be 
accorded economic freedom which does justice to the heterogeneity of 
higher education institutes and the courses that they offer (eg higher qu-
ality, higher tuition fees, more diverse courses, medical studies subjected 
to higher tuition fees than accounting).173 As such, this system is charac-
terised by relatively high tuition fees covering the full costs (including a 
profit margin) of providing the student with an education. Similarly, at 
the demand side, individuals are assumed to act as rational consumers: 
individuals choose how much and what kind of education to obtain based 
on an optimisation of an individual utility function. The role of the state 
is primarily to provide financing options for the student in this regard, as 
the market for study loans suffers from adverse selection (banks would 
tend to choose rich students over poor, future accountants over musici-
ans, etc) leading to inefficient outcomes.174
In the student-as-investor models, the State usually provides (gene-
rous) student loans covering tuition fees, maintenance etc, which are fi-
nanced either through a graduate tax (all students having completed ter-
tiary education pay a tax premium – a  pay-as-you-go system) or income 
contingent loans (whereby a percentage of the income after graduation 
goes to the repayment of the individualised loan. Once the loan is repaid, 
the payment into the system stops – a so-called fully-funded system).175 
The organisational set up of higher education in England, as part of the 
UK, come closest to implementing this system: tuition fees are high and 
practically cover the cost of the student’s studies,176 but general loans are 
available, covering both tuition fees and subsistence, subject to a (mo-
dified) system of income contingent repayment.177 As a result and unlike 
the general trend in the EU, private resources make up the largest com-
ponent of tertiary education financing: only some 30% comes from the 
public purse.178 It follows that the burden of foreign students studying 
173 N Barr, The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: Information, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Role of 
the State (OUP 2001) 192-193.
174 See M Friedman, ‘The Role of Government in Education’ in R Solo (ed), Economics and 
the Public Interest (Rutgers University Press 1955).
175 See generally ibid, chapter 12.
176 See generally P Bolton, ‘Higher Education in England from 2012: Funding and Finance’ 
(2013) SN/SG/6206 House of Commons Library. See in addition P Bolton, ‘Tuition Fee Sta-
tistics’ (2013) SN/SG/917 House of Commons Library.
177 See part 4-6 of The Education (Student Support) Regulations 2011, 2011/1986. See 
further <http://www.studentloanrepayment.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=93,6678408&_
dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL> accessed 2 November 2013.
178 Data obtained from Education at a Glance 2012 (n 154) Indicator B3 < http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2012/indicator-b3-how-much-public-and-pri-
vate-investment-in-education-is-there_eag-2012-18-en> accessed 2 November 2013.
52 Alexander Hoogenboom: Mobility of students and the financial sustainability of higher ...
at educational institutes in England in terms of (non-recoverable) public 
expenditure is limited, notwithstanding the great numbers of foreign stu-
dents studying there: students pay their own way.
At the other end of the spectrum, we have the concept of the student 
as ‘good citizen’.179 Here the State is the main organiser and financer of 
the higher education system, and education is seen as just one of the 
services that the State provides. It is a homogeneous system in that both 
the higher educational institutes and the courses that they offer are tre-
ated as equal (with no greater financing for ‘high quality’ institutes but 
rather financing based on performance in terms, for example, of gradua-
tion rates and research output180).181 The higher education system, rather 
than being market-oriented, is primarily seen as a method to affect social 
change and equality, to promote personal development by engaging the 
(latent) abilities, skills and cognitive resources of individuals, to educate 
a generation capable of independent thought and forming well-informed 
viewpoints, to ensure their preparedness for participation in a dynamic 
and complex society and, finally, to promote participation in and deve-
lopment of the cultural, civil and political community.182 The accessibility 
of higher education to all is of primary importance as a way to mould 
students into productive, active and engaged members of society. 
The system is characterised by low or non-existent tuition fees and 
generous student support in the form of grants supplemented with low-
interest loans. The Scandinavian countries are usually considered the 
‘founding members’ of this tradition and this is reflected in the proportion 
of the tertiary education financed by public resources: in Denmark, Fin-
land and Sweden, the State contributes respectively 95.4%, 95.8% and 
89.8% of the costs of financing tertiary education.183 Looking more closely 
at Denmark, we see that its high proportion of public funding is the re-
sult of a tuition-free higher education system for EU/EEA and Swiss na-
tionals, combined with a generous mixed grant (up to 5753 Danish Krona 
per month not subject to repayment) and loan system (up to 2943 Krona 
per month) for maintenance support of the student.184 It stands to reason 
179 Schwarz and Rehburg (n 172) 531.
180 See eg the situation in Sweden: <http://www.hsv.se/densvenskahogskolan/universite-
tochhogskolor/finansiering.4.539a949110f3d5914ec800063852.html> accessed 2 Novem-
ber 2013. 
181 Barr (n 173) 192-193.
182 See the policy goals underlying the revision of the Swedish Studiestödslag 1999:1395: 
Proposition 1999/2000:10, 65. 
183 Data obtained from Education at a Glance 2012 (n 154) Indicator B3 < http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2012/indicator-b3-how-much-public-and-pri-
vate-investment-in-education-is-there_eag-2012-18-en> accessed 2 November 2013.
184 In addition, some other grants are made available for, eg, students with children. See 
chapter 3 Bekendtgørelse af lov om statens uddannelsesstøtte LBK 2009/661 and <http://
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that, unlike the system in England, the equal treatment rights that EU 
nationals can derive from EU law both as regards access to education 
and as regards study facilitating benefits weigh more heavily on the pu-
blic purse in countries adhering to this model than in the ‘student-as-in-
vestor’ model. As such, the influx of foreign students in Denmark, as seen 
above, can be seen as comparatively more pressing than in the UK.185
The last model is the ‘student-as-child’ approach which takes the 
middle way. Here the primary responsibility for ensuring the education of 
the student lies with the family unit. For that purpose, the family unit is 
expected to draw on its own income obtained from the market, although 
State support is available to supplement the income of those not able 
to afford the education of their children.186 In addition, the State is also 
tasked with managing the higher education system. There are different 
gradations within this model, with the student being primarily treated as 
child who, while studying, lives at home, versus one where the student is 
more independent but is still considered part of the family unit. Schwarz 
and Rehburg see this model as the most widespread one, covering we-
stern, central and southern Europe.187 
On the supply side, the State provides most of the financing, and 
higher education institutes are usually treated homogeneously (with fi-
nancing primarily tied to the number of students, courses offered and, 
for universities, research output in the form of doctoral students and 
publications).188 Tuition fees are usually limited in nature and set for 
all institutes in a universal fashion; student support is generous, albeit 
dependent on the income of the family. The setup in the Flemish Commu-
nity of Belgium is a good example of this tradition: low tuition fees (some 
€600189) combined with student support that varies based on the income 
of the ‘family unit’.190 Those students receiving study grants also pay a 
www.su.dk/SU/satserSU/videregaaende/Sider/default.aspx> accessed 2 November 2013. 
A comparison, in Euros, of the study grants systems of the Nordic countries made by the 
Social Insurance Institution of Finland can be found here <http://www.kela.fi/in/internet/
liite.nsf/alias/nordstod/$File/nordstod.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 2 November 2013.
185 In fact, the Danish political world is considering cutting the generous system as the costs 
for maintaining the current system are increasingly becoming unaffordable. See <http://
www.sydsvenskan.se/danmark/politikerna-vill-banta-generost-studiestod/> accessed 2 
November 2013.
186 See also the explicit reference to this tradition on the website of the Austrian study grant 
authority: <http://www.stipendium.at/studienfoerderung/studienbeihilfe/allgemeines/>.
187 Schwarz and Rehburg (n 172) 531.
188 See, eg, the approach in the Flemish Community of Belgium: Article 9ff of the Decreet 
betreffende de financiering van de werking van de hogescholen en de universiteiten in 
Vlaanderen, Belgisch Staatsblad 2008, 32820.
189 See page 3 of the brochure Studiegelden academiejaar 2013-2014<http://www.ond.
vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/studeren/studiegelden/studiegelden2013-2014.pdf > ac-
cessed 2 November 2013.
190 See Article 5(21) juncto 33 Decreet betreffende de studiefinanciering van de Vlaamse 
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lower tuition fee.191 More support is given if the student lives on his or her 
own rather than with the family.192 The preparatory documents of the De-
cree on Study Finance (which integrates support for primary, secondary 
and tertiary education) reveals that the main goal is indeed to support 
families on whose budget the education of the children weighs heaviest 
in order to encourage greater participation at all levels of education.193 In 
terms of the impact of foreign EU students studying in countries adhe-
ring to this model, it may be expected to lie between the ‘investor’ and 
the ‘good citizen’ model: tuition fees are low, which means that the ‘state 
subsidy’ for each student in higher education is high.194 Student support 
is relatively generous, but not as extensive as in the countries following 
the Scandinavian model. 
4. Balancing the scales 
Looking at the two sides presented above, it seems justified to 
conclude that in a general sense Member States’ attempts at restricting 
access to higher education institutes established within their territory or 
by limiting eligibility for study facilitating benefits (and the export thereof) 
for economic reasons should be struck down. Free movement of students 
has its own inherent economic logic that militates against restrictions for 
economic or budgetary reasons: student mobility forms an important link 
in the optimal allocation of highly skilled individuals in the EU and also 
constitutes a crucial learning experience for the student by which he or 
she becomes a more productive and adaptable worker. Empirics seem to 
support this overall conclusion. As seen above, a study conducted by the 
Central Planning Agency of the Netherlands, which is a net receiver of 
students and which with 72% public financing of tertiary education takes 
an intermediate position in the EU, showed a net benefit to the public 
purse attributed to EU students of some €652 million a year. While this 
outcome depends on a number of variables, not the least of which the 
propensity of students to stay after their studies, one can still expect the 
benefits to be significant even in Member States with a lower staying rate 
or a higher degree of public financing. Moreover, as seen, sending States 
Gemeenschap Belgisch Staatsblad 2007, 38879. See also <http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/
studietoelagen/brochure12-13/toelagenperonderwijsniveau/hogeronderwijs/> accessed 2 
November 2013 for an example calculation.
191 See Article 57 Decreet betreffende de flexibilisering van het hoger onderwijs in Vlaande-
ren en houdende dringende hogeronderwijsmaatregelen, Belgisch Staatsblad 2004, 71039.
192 See Article 44 Decreet betreffende de studiefinanciering van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 
Belgisch Staatsblad 2007, 38879
193 Ontwerp van de Decreet betreffende de studiefinanciering in de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 
Parl St Vl Parl 2006-2007, nr 1171/1, 3, 5.
194 See, eg, the percentages of the proportion of public financing of Belgium, Italy, Greece 
and Ireland. 
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need not worry either as there seems to be no evidence for the oft-invoked 
spectre of brain drain. 
Notwithstanding this general conclusion, it should also be recogni-
sed that the ‘one size fits all’ nature of the principles developed by the 
Court has a differential impact on some Member States: the financial 
responsibility or burden of enabling and promoting student mobility is 
unevenly divided among the Member States. Equal treatment as regards 
access to education weighs more heavily on, say, Sweden than it does on 
the United Kingdom (England); similarly, export of study grants is likely 
to cost the Netherlands more, in a relative sense, than it does in France 
which only provides limited export support.195 Consider further that while 
the benefit to the public purse as a whole may be large, it is unclear what 
the net effect is on higher education budgets, specifically in the receiving 
Member States: how much of the gain is in practice reinvested in higher 
education? Greater (foreign) student numbers enrolling in higher educa-
tion institutes without an accompanying increase in spending on higher 
education will mean that the amount of financing per student drops, 
which in turn almost certainly has consequences for the quality of edu-
cation for all students. 
Whereas these issues may not yet be so pressing at the moment, it 
will be recalled that student mobility in the EU is a growing phenomenon 
and enjoys active support in both the Bologna as well as the EU context. 
In respect to the latter, the Council has set the goal that by 2020, 20% 
of all higher education graduates should have had some higher educa-
tion or related training experience abroad.196 As such, the issue can be 
expected to become more pressing in the future. The question remains 
about how to address this growing tension between greater student mo-
bility and the financial sustainability of higher education systems. Three 
approaches may be considered:
1. Maintaining the status quo. 
The normative justification for doing so could lie in the concept of EU 
transnational solidarity. The argument would run that as the European 
Union grows ever more tightly knit, the narrow weighing of costs and 
benefits within one sector becomes increasingly inappropriate. The bene-
fits of establishing the internal market, for example, can very well vastly 
outweigh ‘losses’ in particular (sub)sectors such as this one. As such, the 
fact that some Member States contribute more to student mobility than 
195 See 2012-0029 Modalités d’attribution des bourses d’enseignement supérieur sur critères 
sociaux et des aides au mérite et à la mobilité international pour l’année 2012-2013 of 19 
July 2012: mobility grants are only offered for credit mobility purposes. In contrast, the 
Netherlands offers full export abroad: Article 2.14 Wet studiefinanciering 2000.
196 Council Conclusions on a benchmark for learning mobility, OJ [2011] C 372/31, 34.
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others is, in this view, ‘in the grand scheme of things’ irrelevant: these 
Member States are rather required to take this into their stride in view of 
the benefits they gain elsewhere from European cooperation.
The problem with this (decentralised) approach, however, is that po-
litical or budgetary realities may be such that these Member States are 
in essence forced to address the mounting pressure on the educational 
budget and adopt higher education policies that go against their pre-
ferred principles of organising their higher education systems. Consider 
that mobile German and French students put significant pressure on 
the sustainability of open access systems such as Austria and Belgium. 
These Member States in turn felt obliged to limit access by means of a 
quota to seek to manage these flows, whereas both France and Germany 
retained the freedom to do as they wished. Similarly, as a result of the 
Court’s ruling in Commission v the Netherlands, the Dutch government 
put a funding cap on the export of study grants, notwithstanding its 
commitment to introducing portable study grants.197 In a general sense, 
with the disparities in financial responsibility for the free movement of 
students comes a reduced scope for action for some (smaller) Member 
States: they are caught between a rock (political/budgetary realities) and 
a hard place (the Court’s case law). Others (usually larger Member Sta-
tes), who in some sense can be seen as the ‘cause’ for mobility flows (eg 
the numerus clausus systems of France and Germany restricting access 
to medical courses), remain scot free. This is an undesirable consequence 
in a policy area, belonging primarily to the Member States, which is in-
tricately tied up with societal values: the freedom of some Member States 
to organise their higher education system according to their preferred 
principles must not impinge on the freedom of other Member States to 
do the same.
2. Allowing unilateral restrictions.
A second way to address the tension would be to allow those Member 
States who can properly substantiate their exceptional ‘burden’ in ena-
bling and promoting student mobility to maintain the unilateral restricti-
ons they deem necessary to alleviate this burden. The problem with this 
approach is that it essentially comes down to ‘passing the buck’: it redi-
rects flows to other Member States who in turn may be faced with an (in 
their eyes) unmanageable influx of students and will eventually reduce 
student mobility altogether as students become progressively discoura-
ged by the many barriers existing abroad. As with all forms of ‘protectio-
nism’, such a system would in the end be self-defeating, and lead to the 
non-attainment of the mobility goals.
197 Brief aan de Tweede Kamer: Reactie op Uitspraak Commissie-Nederland C-542/09 of 15 
June 2012 2012D25781.
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3. A multilateral solution.
A third approach would be for the EU legislator to intervene. It is 
arguable that (the promotion of) student mobility fulfils the requirements 
of a public good in economic terms: in a globalised and increasingly in-
tegrated European Union the benefits generated by student mobility are 
increasingly non-rivalrous in nature (all Member States may benefit from 
greater innovation, enhanced productivity etc) and, as a result of the 
right of free movement among the EU Member States, non-excludable (no 
Member State can ‘retain’ the student against his or her will through im-
migration law).198 Economic theory teaches that this is a reason for State 
intervention. The nature of a public good is such that it provides benefits 
to all, but all (here the Member States) equally have an incentive not to 
finance the good precisely for that reason: if ‘others’ finance the good, the 
benefits still accrue to the free-rider, leading to advantages at no cost. 
The result, of course, is that no one is willing to finance the public good. 
It should be remarked, however, that the theory does not fully hold 
for student mobility. Some of the elements that promote such mobility 
(high quality education, comprehensive study grant systems) are finan-
ced by Member States for reasons other than mere economic gain and 
in any case student mobility is not the foremost consideration in terms 
of deciding on public expenditure in this regard. However, in general 
the idea of Member States free-riding in the context of student mobility 
cannot be excluded, especially with the current uneven division of stu-
dent flows among the EU Member States (eg Germany ‘outsourcing’ the 
training of medical professionals to Austria). As such, there is perhaps 
scope for EU intervention in this regard, perhaps in the form of an EU 
reimbursement scheme and/or study loan system.
Following the Erasmus judgment199 and the introduction of EU com-
petences in the field of education  in Article 165 and 166 TFEU, it seems 
pretty clear that competence exists at the EU level to set up an EU grant/
loan system for mobility purposes (going beyond credit mobility, which 
Erasmus focuses on, to funding full study periods abroad): the Treaties 
refer to the power to adopt ‘incentive measures’200 for the purposes of pur-
suing the objectives of EU educational policy, which include student mo-
bility.201 This study grant/loan system could have two major components:
1. A State-to-State reimbursement system. This system should ope-
rate on the principle that Member States are responsible for their 
198 See also N Barr et al, ‘Feasibility Study on Student Lending’ (EAC/47/2009 Report to the 
European Commission: Directorate-General for Education and Culture  2011)  x.
199 Case 242/87 Commission v Council (ERASMUS) [1989] ECR 1425.
200 Article 165(4) TFEU. The same limitation is not apparent in Article 166(4) TFEU.
201 See Articles 165(2) and 166(2) TFEU.
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citizens’ education and is meant to avoid abuse of the mobility 
of students: a Member State could conceivably send the majo-
rity of its students abroad to receive education, thereby freeing 
up the resources it would otherwise have to commit towards that 
individual’s education. In order to ensure a degree of fairness and 
in the light of the great disparity among the Member States in 
resources committed at the tertiary education level (in particular 
between the original EU15 and the new EU13), the following prin-
ciple is suggested. The reimbursement rate as a base determinant 
should be the real costs borne by the public purse in the host Sta-
te for the education of a student, but with the upper limit that the 
reimbursement could not exceed the costs the reimbursing State 
would bear had the student been educated in the home State.202 
While this will not lead to full reimbursement in all cases, it seems 
a fairer system than the current one, where the net recipients 
bear the greatest costs. Whereas the political feasibility of such 
a system, especially in the current economic situation, seems so-
mewhat limited, there is an argument to be made that the princi-
ple of loyal cooperation found in Article 4(3) TEU requires Member 
States that are net senders to cooperate with net recipients to find 
a solution. As shown above, in an internal market characterised 
by free movement and a presumption in favour of unrestricted 
student mobility, the educational policies of one Member State 
directly affect the sustainability of the higher education system 
in another Member State. In view of these spill-over effects, and 
in view of the general aim of promoting student mobility, ‘sending 
Member States’ can at least to some extent be held responsible 
for the restrictions introduced by the receiving Member States 
(eg such as in Bressol). This leads one to question whether these 
Member States can really refuse to at least consider a reimburse-
ment system in the light of their obligation to ‘facilitate the achie-
vement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’.203 
2. A study loan system available for students exercising their free 
movement rights to study in another Member State other than 
their Member State of nationality (and/or their Member State or 
previous study). A recent study on the feasibility of an EU student 
lending facility conducted by Barr et al concludes that an EU loan 
system covering both tuition fee and maintenance cost in the host 
202 Similar to the situation in healthcare under the free movement of services provisions, 
see A Dawes, ‘“Bonjour Herr Doctor”: National Healthcare Systems, the Internal Market and 
Cross-border Medical Care within the European Union’ (2006) 33(2) Legal Issues of Econo-
mic Integration 167, 170-174.
203 Article 4(3) TEU.
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State (initially for master students only) with repayment based 
on fixed repayments (a mortgage style loan) imposed on middle to 
high income individuals and income contingent repayments for 
low income individuals (scaling with ability to pay) is both desira-
ble and feasible.204 The cost of such a system, should one adhere 
to the goal of ensuring 20% mobility of (master) students, would 
not be insignificant: it is estimated that the financing needs wo-
uld run to €5 billion a year.205 However, it seems quite clear that 
this figure would be more than offset in terms of benefits for the 
EU Member States. Both the reduced pressure on national study 
grant schemes as well as the benefits brought about by greater 
student mobility more generally206 should be more than sufficient 
to convince the Member States to consider the option.207
5. Conclusion
Overall, therefore, there seems to be enough room for and even a 
certain degree of urgency in favour of a broader discussion as regards the 
future of student mobility in the European Union and the role that the 
latter may play, beyond the judgments of the Court of Justice, in the pro-
motion thereof. It is submitted here that now this role is underdeveloped 
in that student mobility is primarily an uncoordinated and unmanaged 
phenomenon, the principles of which are set out progressively by the 
Court in its case law. However, in the light of the ever growing number 
of foreign students seeking access to higher education in a Member Sta-
te that is not their own, it is time the discussion moved towards more 
concrete action at the initiative of EU policy makers.
204 Barr (n 198) chapter 5 and 1. The reason for the distinction between high, middle and 
low income groups is to ensure the attractiveness and flexibility of the system necessary to 
attract those interested in borrowing from it.
205 ibid 91.
206 For further gains of an EU student loan system, including economies of scale and its 
ability to better manage asymmetric student migration flows, see Barr (n 198) 13-22.
207 The Commission in its Erasmus For All programme favours the adoption of such a 
system.  See Commission, ‘Erasmus For All: The EU Programme for Education, Training, 
Youth and Sport’ (Communication) COM (2011) 787 final.
